(Mirrored from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmchist/lebanon.txt)

                               MARINES IN LEBANON



                                 Jack Shulimson

                        Historical Branch, G-3 Division

                       Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps

                            Washington, D. C. 20380

                            DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
                            WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380


This is a history of the Marine Corps participation in the Lebanon crisis from 
July-October 1958.  It is published to show the role of the U. S. Marine Corps 
in carrying out American foreign policy and the pacification of a country 
through a successful show of force.  The account is based on the records of 
the U. S. Marine Corps and selected records of the U. S. Army, Navy, Air 
Force, and Department of State.  In addition appropriate published accounts 
have been utilized.  The comments of and interviews with key participants have 
been incorporated into the text.  It must be noted, however, that although 
this monograph has been cleared for publication by the Department of Defense, 
many of the documents cited still retain a security classification.

                                   W. R. COLLINS
                         Major General, U. S. Marine Corps
                           Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Reviewed and approved:


                               TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                            Original   On-Line
                                                              Page       Page

     The Political Background- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   1            6

     The Military Response--Background - - - - - - - - - - -   7           12

     The Landing--D-Day- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  11           17

     The Move Into Beirut- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  16           23

     The Continuing Mission and Withdrawal - - - - - - - - -  22           31


Map 1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Inside front cover

Map 2- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - facing  9

Map 3- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - facing 12

Photo of Landing of 3/6, 16Jul58 - - - - - - - - - - - facing 18

Photo of meeting between General Chehab and
     high ranking American officials, 16Jul58- - - - - facing 20

Photo of Marine Motorized Patrol - - - - - - - - - - - facing 27

Section I Notes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  37           47

Section II Notes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  38           48

Section III Notes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  39           49

Section IV Notes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  40           50

Section V Notes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  41           51

Command Structure American Forces, Lebanon
     effective 26 July 1958- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  44           54

Command and 2d Provisional Marine Force
     as of 19 July 1958- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  45           55

List of Marine Units Eligible for Armed Forces
     Expeditionary Medal - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  48           58

                                   Section I
                            The Political Background

     The waning British and French influence in the Middle East after World 
War II gave rise to constant strife in this area of the world.  The region was 
not only stirred by the growth of local nationalism but also by the conflict 
between the East and West in the Cold War.  Crisis followed crisis as the 
newly independent states attempted to adjust to the post war world.

     In 1948, after the British had given up the attempt to pacify Palestine, 
Jews and Arabs clashed in the short Arab-Israeli War of that year.  The 
antagonism between the Jewish state of Israel and its Arab neighbors has 
become a permanent feature of Middle East relations.  This hostility was 
intensified by the 1952 revolution in Egypt and the subsequent rise to 
undisputed power in 1954 of its strongest figure, Gamal Abdul Nasser.  Sparked 
by his leadership, there arose a new mutant pan-Arab movement over which Egypt 
attempted to gain hegemony.  "This Arab Nationalism contributed to a series of 
events--the Egyptian arms deal with Russia, the withdrawal of the U. S. offer 
to assist the Aswan Dam project, and Nasser's nationalization of the Suez 
Canal--that culminated in the Suez crisis of 1956, when the Israelis attacked 
Egypt and the British and French intervened."<2>  This intervention, though 
blocked by the United Nations, served to reinforce Arab anti-Western 
sentiments.  The Arab unrest led to civil strife in Lebanon, and the overthrow 
of a Western aligned government in Iraq in 1958.

     The Western Powers feared the complete disintegration of the peace in the 
Middle East and the possibility of Soviet exploitation of the crisis.  The 
overt American reaction was to send U. S. Marines to Lebanon on 15 July 1958 
at the request of that government.  This Marine landing was a practical 
example of the use of amphibious forces to support U. S. foreign policy by the 
application of military strength and mobility.

     In historic times, its geographical location at the eastern end of the 
Mediterranean made Lebanon the crossroads to Africa, Europe, and Asia.  The 
country has been an important commercial and trading center since the time of 
the ancient Phoenicians.  Its mountainous barrier has enabled the nation to 
maintain a distinctive identity throughout the centuries.  In the 20th 
century, the construction of pipelines from the oil fields of Iran and Saudi 
Arabia to the Lebanese port cities of Tripoli and Sidon increased the 
strategic importance of the country.


     Lebanon is smaller than Connecticut, occupying an area 120 miles from 
north south and 30 to 34 miles from east to west.  The country consists of 
four distinct regions extending eastwards from the coast: the Mediterranean 
lowland, Lebanon Mountains, a fertile plateau called the El Bika and 
Anti-Lebanon Mountains.  Syria borders the nation on the north and east, 
Israel on the south, and the Mediterranean in the west.  (See Map 1)

     In contrast to most Arab nations, approximately half of the 1.5 million 
population of Lebanon is Christian.  Christianity in this area had its roots 
in the Roman Empire and by the second century A.D. Lebanon was the seat of a 
Christian bishopric.  In the seventh century A.D., however, Lebanon was 
conquered by the Arab Moslems.  The process of Islamization or the country was 
never fully completed.  The mountains of the region proved a sanctury to the 
Christians and even to dissident Moslem sects.

     Lebanon, today, is a mosaic of various religious factions.  There are 
Maronites, Chaldeans, and Greek, Syrian, and Armenian Catholics, all in 
communion with Rome, but following their own rituals.  Other Christian sects 
include the Greek and Armenian Orthodox, Jacobites, Nestorians, and 
Protestants.  Among the non-Christian elements are Jews, Druze, and Sunni and 
Shiite Moslems.  The National Constitution of 1926 recognized this religious 
framework by requiring the allocation of government jobs and appointments on a 
religious basis.  An unwritten gentlemen's agreement, worked out by Christian 
and Moslem leaders in 1943 and referred to as the National Covenant, secured 
the organization of the government on this "confessional" basis.  The 
traditional practices of selecting a Maronite president, a Sunni Moslem 
premier, and a Shiite speaker of parliament, as well as allocating 
parliamentary seats on the basis of the relative numerical strength of 
religious communities in each electorial district, are traceable to this 

     Because of the existence of large Christian population, Lebanon, more 
than the other Arab nations in the Middle East, has been influenced greatly by 
the western world.  Contact between Western Europeans and the Christian 
Lebanese dates back to the Crusades.  For two centuries: the coastal regions 
of Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine were occupied by the Crusaders, until they 
were driven out by the Mameluke Sultans from Egypt.  The area then fell under 
the control of the Ottoman Turks, who defeated the Mamelukes in 1517.  Through 
treaty with the Turks, French Jesuits established residence in Lebanon during 
the 16th century.  They opened schools and introduced French culture and 
customs to the Lebanese Christians.  King Louis XIV of France in 1649 declared 
himself the protector of the Christian Maronites in Lebanon.  This French 
ascendency among the Christian Lebanese has been a dominant feature in the 
internal history of Lebanon.  When in 1860, the Druze, a Moslem sect located 
in the mountains of Lebanon and Syria, massacred thousands of the Maronites,


French troops landed to intercede on behalf of the Christians.  Turkey was 
forced by the European powers to grant semi-autonomy to the Maronites in the 
Mount Lebanon area under a Christian governor.

     The founding of the American University and the French Universite de 
Saint-Joseph in Beirut greatly extended Western influence during the 19th 
century.  After World War I, the League of Nations selected France as the 
mandate power for the Levant countries of Lebanon and Syria.  The French 
cultural ascendency was greatly enhanced throughout Lebanon during the years 

     Lebanon became independent during World War II.  Since then the basic 
feature of Lebanese political and religious life has been the rivalry of the 
Moslem and Christian communities.  In the unwritten Lebanese National Pact of 
1943, the leaders of the two faiths attempted to resolve the basic issues.  
They agreed that the Christians were to abandon dependence on France and the 
Moslems were to give up fusion with Syria.  The Arab character of Lebanon was 
to be recognized.  A general Middle East conference on Arab unity held in 
Alexandria, Egypt from 25 September to 7 October 1944 acknowledged the 
independence and sovereignty of Lebanon within its existing frontiers.  The 
Lebanese joined the Arab League Pact on 22 March 1945.  The country allied 
itself with the other nations of the League in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, 
although its military contribution was insignificant. 

     This precarious unity of the Arab nations disintegrated under internal 
and external pressures.  After 1952, Egypt under Nasser moved further into the 
neutralist bloc of nations and improved relations with the Soviet Union.  
Nasserism became synonymous with a strident Arab nationalism opposed to all 
non-Arab interests in the Middle East and especially directed against France 
and England.  The big split in the Arab world occurred in 1955 with the 
adherence of Iraq to the Baghdad Pact with Great Britain, Turkey, Iran, and 
Pakistan.  The pact was a defensive alliance directed against Soviet 
aggression.  Other Arab nations were invited to join, but none did.  The Arab 
League divided into pro-Western and anti-Western groups; Egypt and Syria on 
one side and Iraq and Jordan on the other.

     Lebanon, because of her delicate internal situation, attempted to play 
the honest broker between the two camps.  President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon 

        Everyone of us gives due appreciation to the agreements made in 
     support of the Iraqi-Turkish agreement, on the one hand, and the 
     objections to its conclusions on the other.  What is important to find
     is a solution reconciling the opposite points of view, thus safeguarding
     the Arab League from the danger threatening it.<3>


This attempt at mediation failed.  Chamoun, who was the predominant figure in 
the jungle of Lebanese politics, came under Egyptian propaganda attack.  He 
then led his government slowly into support of Western policy.

     In 1956, Lebanon refused to break diplomatic relations with  Great 
Britain and France over the Suez crisis.  This stand caused tension within the 
Lebanese republic.  The Sunni Moslem Prime Minister, Abdallah Yafi, resigned 
because of Chamoun's refusal to take action against the two Western powers.  
Opposition against Chamoun grew stronger as Lebanon accepted the Eisenhower 
Doctrine for the Middle East in 1957.  Under this program, the United States 
was to send military and economic aid to any Middle Eastern nation threatened 
by Communist aggression.  Lebanon took a firm step into the anti-Communist 
bloc of nations.

     Both domestic and foreign pressures on Lebanon increase with the union of 
Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic in February 1958.  President 
Chamoun had been elected in 1952 for a six-year period.  According to the 
Lebanese constitution, the president could not succeed himself in office.  
There were indications, nevertheless, that Chamoun desired to have the 
constitution amended so that he could be reelected.  The president in Lebanon 
is not selected in a general election, but rather by the Parliament.  Here, 
Chamoun had a large majority.  The internal opposition to the Lebanese 
President grew more vocal.

     The climax to this situation occurred on 8 May 1958.  Nassit el Metui, 
the editor of the Beirut newspaper, AL TELEGRAF, was killed by unknown 
assassins.  Metui had strongly opposed Chamoun and his policies.  The 
opposition forces in Lebanon immediately blamed the government for the 
assassination.  Disorders broke out in Tripoli on the 9th and rioters burned 
the United States Information Agency building in the city as a reaction to 
Chamoun's sympathy with the Western powers.  On 12 May, the leaders of the 
Basta, the Moslem sector of Beirut, called a general strike.  The Lebanese 
situation developed very rapidly into an armed stalemate.  The rebels in 
Tripoli under the leadership of Rashid Karami controlled that predominately 
Moslem city.  Other rebel elements wielded power in the Moslem city of Sidon 
in the south and large areas in the El Bika Valley contiguous to Syria.  The 
Druze under Chieftan Kamal Jumblatt, in the central region of Lebanon, the 
Chouf, opposed the government.  The insurgents in the Basta area of Beirut 
were led by Saeb Salem, a former Lebanese premier.  Most of these rebel 
leaders had been defeated in local elections in 1957, through the intervention 
of Chamoun.<4>  Armed civilian partisans of President Chamoun were the main 
support of the government.  The multi-religious Parti Populaire Syrienne (PPS) 
and the Christian Phalange party were the most prominent groups in Chamoun's 
defense force.  Even though the revolution cut


across religious differences in individual cases, the basic divergence was 
between Moslem and Christian.

     The Lebanese army was a reflection of Lebanese society.  General Fuad 
Chehab, the commander in chief and a Christian, feared a holocaust between the 
two religious factions.  He was afraid that any attempt to put down the revolt 
by armed force would mean the dissolution of his army into Christian and 
Moslem armed cliques.  The Army and its commander in chief maintained a strict 
neutrality.  Chehab intervened only to keep certain essential communications 
open and to prevent rebel sorties from their strongholds in Tripoli, the 
Chouf,  and the Basta area of Beirut.

     The threat to Lebanon was not only internal chaos but foreign aggression 
as well.  There were reports that infiltrators from Syria were entering 
Lebanon and aiding the rebel cause with men and materiel.  The radio attacks 
of the UAR became even more strident against President Chamoun.

     On 14 May, the American Ambassador in response to a requests by President 
Chamoun for standby aid, stated that:

       ...although Lebanon should not invoke American assistance
     unless its integrity were generally threatened and its own 
     forces were not sufficient for the protection of the State,
     nevertheless, the United States was prepared, upon request
     both from the President and the government of Lebanon, to
     send certain combat forces.<5>

     The American government made it clear that it would not intervene, 
however, to insure Chamoun's possibilities for reelection.  The U. S. expected 
Lebanon to file a complaint with the United Nations Security Council, and on 6 
June, the Lebanese Foreign Minister did so.  On the 11th, the council decided 
to send a group of observers to Lebanon to report back concerning any foreign 
interference.  The U. N. group, hampered by lack of transportation and 
confined largely to the few principal highways kept open by Lebanese security 
forces, was unable to obtain any evidence indicating large-scale intervention 
by forces of the United Arab Republic.  It seemed as if the Lebanese political 
situation would remain in a permanent state of instability.  This was all 
dramatically changed by the events of the 14th of July in Iraq.

     A coup d'etat by Brigadier Abdel Karem Kassem overthrew the Iraq 
government.  The young Iraqi King, Faisal, was murdered and the Premier, Nuri 
Said, was killed while attempting to flee.  These violent happenings appeared 
to threaten the entire Western strategic position in the Middle East.  The 
Iraqi revolution destroyed the government of the only Arab member of the 
Baghdad Pact and put an end to the Iraq-Jordan


Federation, which had been formed in March to counterbalance the union of 
Egypt and Syria.  King Hussein of Jordan had reason to fear for his own 
throne, and in Lebanon, President Chamoun appealed to the United States and 
Great Britain to intervene within 48 hours.<6>

     The Iraqi Revolution caught official Washington by surprise.  Trouble had 
been expected in Jordan or perhaps Lebanon, but not in Iraq.  The oilfields in 
Iraq and the oil pipeline terminating in Tripoli were extremely important to 
the economy and military effectiveness of the Western nations.

     The first news of the upheaval in Iraq reached Washington about 0300 
(Washington time) 14 July.  Early reports were fragmentary, but by early 
morning the situation had clarified, and President Eisenhower was informed at 
0730.  Secretary of State John Foster Dulles arrived at his office at 0815 for 
an intelligence briefing and a look at the most urgent cables. The President 
met with the National Security Council at 0930 Secretary of State Dulles, Vice 
President Richard M. Nixon, and General Nathan F. Twining, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, joined the conference at 1030.  The Secretary outlined 
the situation in the Middle East and recommended that U. S. military forces 
land in Lebanon in response to President Chamoun's appeal.  President 
Eisenhower agreed that some action must be taken.  This meeting lasted until 

     At about 1430 the same day, the President met with the Republican and 
Democratic leaders of Congress.  The President is reputed to have said:

        I have discussed this with my people here and in the
     National Security Council but I must emphasize that no
     decision has been made.  I want to give you the pros and
     cons.  But must also emphasize that a decision must be made
     in the immediate future...within the next hour or two.<8>

     The President then returned to his meeting with his military and civilian 
advisers.  They discussed the possibility of British participation, which 
President Eisenhower rejected in that he felt "that United States forces would 
be adequate, and with the 3700 British troops intact on Cyprus, a reserve 
would be available...."<9>  General Twining informed him that the Joint Chiefs 
were unanimously of the opinion that action must be taken immediately. 
According to one source, at 1643 President Eisenhower turned to General 
Twining and said "all right we'll send `em in.  Nate, put it into 
operation."<10>.  The assignment to carry out President Eisenhower orders went 
to the amphibious units of the Sixth Fleet.


                                   Section II
                       The Military Response--Background

     The Sixth Fleet on 14 July 1958 consisted of 3 carriers, 2 cruisers, 22 
destroyers, and approximately 50 other support vessels under the overall 
command of Vice Admiral Charles R. Brown.<2>  On this date, the 2d Provisional 
Marine Force (Task Force 62), consisting of three battalion landing teams 
(BLTs), under the command of Brigadier General Sidney S. Wade was the landing 
force of the Sixth Fleet.

     The reason for the buildup of the Marine contingent stemmed in part from 
a November 1957 directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  At that time, the 
Joint Chiefs advised Admiral James L. Holloway, Commander in Chief, Naval 
Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CinCNELM) with headquarters in 
London, that there were distinct possibilities of an overthrow of the 
Jordanian government and to a lesser extent of a coup d'etat in Lebanon.  
Admiral Holloway was directed to plan for limited action in the Middle cast in 
the event these contingencies occurred.  It was decided that if military 
action was required, the Specified Command Middle East (SPECOMME), with 
Admiral Holloway as Commander in Chief, would be activated.  His authority 
would extend over all U. S. forces in the area.

     Headquarters, 2d Provisional Marine Force was established on 10 January 
1958 at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.  This headquarters was to plan and 
conduct COMBINE II, a combined exercise.  COMBINE II was to be a practice 
landing operation involving units of the U. S. Marines, British Royal Marines, 
and Italian Navy off the coast of Southern Sardinia in the Western 

     General Wade's assignment was abruptly altered on 13 May 1958 when the 
riots in Tripoli broke out.  Colonel Henry W. Buse, Chief of Staff of Fleet 
Marine Force Atlantic, telephoned General Wade to alert him to the dangerous 
situation in Lebanon and to inform him that it was necessary to move the 
headquarters of the 2d Provisional Marine Force into the Mediterranean area 
immediately.  General Wade and his staff departed on 14 May 1958.

     The 2d Provisional Marine Force at this time was composed of two Marine 
BLTs:  the 1st Battalion (Reinforced), 8th Marines (1/8) commanded by 
Lieutenant Colonel John H. Brickley and the 2d Battalion (Reinforced), 2d 
Marines (2/2) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harry A. Hadd.  BLT 1/8 had been 
the landing force attached to the Sixth Fleet since January 1958 and was due 
for reassignment to the United States.  BLT 2/2


left Morehead City, North Carolina on 1 May 1958 to relieve 1/8 on 15 May at 
Gibralter.  Because of the mounting tension in Lebanon, however, it was 
decided to keep both Marine battalions assigned to the Mediterranean Fleet.<4>

     Previously in 1958, BLT 1/8 had completed a contingency plan for a 
possible landing in Lebanon.  Much of the plan was based on the intelligence 
information gathered by the battalion operations officer,  Major Victor 
Stoyanow, who had travelled to Beirut incognito and had toured the beach 
areas.<5>  At the time of the Tripoli riots, the plan was further developed 
into a two-battalion assault involving both 2/2 and 1/8.  On 18 May 1958, 
General Wade and Rear Admiral Robert W. Cavenagh, the amphibious task force 
commander, established their headquarters on the MOUNT MCKINLEY, then off the 
coast of Crete, and immediately began to draw up a Lebanon landing plan based 
on the 1/8 contingency plan and revisions.<6>  Wade and Cavenagh had worked 
out most of the details by 21 May, when they were joined on board the MOUNT 
MCKINLEY, now off the coast of Cyprus, by Brigadier J. W. C. Williams (Staff, 
British Middle East Land Forces) and Brigadier John A. Read, Commander of the 
British 3d Infantry Brigade, to formulate plans for an Anglo-American landing 
in Lebanon.  The next day at Cyprus, they were joined by Brigadier General 
David W. Gray of the U. S. 11th Airborne Division.  According to the latter:

        On arrival in Cyprus, I was informed by a staff officer
     from Admiral Holloway's headquarters that I was to preside at
     a joint U.S./British meeting to develop a plan for combined
     intervention in Lebanon and Jordan....During the one-day
     conference, a concept of operations was rather easily developed
     as it was assumed that the British would go into Lebanon with
     either U. S. Army or Marine forces, but not both.  The British
     were therefore given the missions originally assigned to U. S.
     forces in the Lebanon plan and the U. S. Forces, either Army
     or Marine Corps, were given the remaining missions....Following
     this conference all forces involved---developed supporting plans
     for CinCNELM's Operational Plan 1-58 known as BLUEBAT.<7>  

     The plan called for the simultaneous landing of two Marine BLTs, one 
coming ashore northeast of Beirut to secure the water supply systems, bridges, 
and the northeastern sector of the city and the other striking across the 
beaches south of Beirut to seize the airport.  As soon as the Marine BLT had 
established control of the airport, a British infantry brigade would be flown 
in from Cyprus.  When the first brigade units arrived the Marine BLT was to 
move into the city and gain control of the port.  The brigade was to take up 
positions at the airport.<8>  The objective of this plan was to support the 
legal Lebanese government against any foreign invasion, specifically against 
the Syrian First Army located between Damascus and the Israel border and only 
a few hours march from Beirut.


     For the 2d Provisional Marine Force and the Sixth Fleet, the rest of May 
and June 1958 were periods of conferring rapid planning, and ship deployment 
and redeployment.  Preparations also continued for Exercise COMBINE II, which 
was not cancelled until 1 July 1958.  By that date, it appeared as if the 
crisis in the Mediterranean had subsided for the time being.  It was decided 
to grant the Sixth Fleet a short in-port visit.  Only Captain Victor B. 
McCrea's Amphibious Squadron 6 (TransPhibRon 6) with BLT 2/2 on board, was to 
remain at sea, within 12 hours sailing time from Beirut.

     On 25 June 1958, the 3d Battalion (Reinforced), 6th Marines (3/6), 
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Jenkins, left Morehead City in the 
ships of TransPhibRon 2, to replace BLT 1/8 embarked in TransPhibRon 4.  On 12 
July 1958, Rear Admiral Howard A. Yeager in the USS POCONO, arrived off the 
coast of Crete and relieved Admiral Cavenagh as Amphibious Task Force 
commander.  General Wade transferred his headquarters from the MOUNT MCKINLEY 
to the POCONO.

     On 14 July 1958 BLT 1/8, just north of Malta, was en route to the United 
States; BLT 3/6 was sailing from Suda Bay, Crete to Athens.  Only BLT 2/2, 
located off the southern coast of Cyprus, was in a position to land on 24-hour 
notice.  The LSD (Landing Ship, Dock) Plymouth Rock, carrying the artillery 
battery, shore party detachment, underwater demolition team, heavy equipment, 
and two of the five M-48 tanks of BLT 2/2, was en route to Malta, for repairs.  
Another LSD, the FORT SNELLING, carrying a similar load for BLT 3/6, was off 
the coast of Rhodes, approximately 400 nautical miles from Lebanon, and was in 
a position to furnish support to BLT 2/2 with less than 30-hours' notice.  
(See Map 2)

     These dispositions of the Marine BLTs in the Mediterranean were an 
important consideration when at 0930 Washington time (1430 London time, 1530 
Beirut time) on 14 July, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO), first notified CinCNELM headquarters of the possibility of intervention 
in Lebanon within 48 hours.  General Wade's headquarters first received 
warning of a possible landing in Lebanon at 1715 Beirut time (1115 Washington 
time).  Shortly before 1500 Washington time (2100 Beirut time) Admiral Burke 
sent to CinCNELM and the Commander of the Sixth Fleet a message advising them 
of the imminence of President Eisenhower's decision.  TransPhibRon 6 was aware 
of the possibility of a landing in Lebanon but did not know whether the 
BLUEBAT plan was to be implemented.  Captain McCrea and Lieutenant Colonel 
Hadd felt it necessary to continue preparation of plans for a possible landing 
in the vicinity of the Lebanese city of Tripoli, the stronghold of the rebels.

     At 1823 Washington time (0030 Beirut time), Admiral Burke relayed 
President Eisenhower's decision to CinCNELM and the 


Commander of the Sixth Fleet.  The Marines were directed to land on Red Beach 
near the Beirut International Airport at 1500 (Beirut time) on 15 July 1958.  
The mission of the landing team was to seize the airfield and implement as 
much of the BLUEBAT plan as possible.<9>  Admiral Burke recalled:

        I had had several discussions with President Eisenhower
     that I needed at least 24 hours' warning.  However, when the
     time came, he actually gave us...13 hours, before the landing.
     I suspected this might happen and asked the Amphibious Force
     to stay out of sight from the Lebanon coast--but close.  When
     I told President Eisenhower that he had cut my warning time
     in half, he said, "Well, I know that, but I'm sure you can do
     that all right."<10>

     Burke signaled Captain McCrea and Lieutenant Colonel Hadd "As you land 
you will be writing another chapter in our country's history.  I am confident 
you will uphold the traditions of the Navy and Marine Corps.  God Bless 



                                     MAP 2 
                    DISPOSITION OF MARINE UNITS 14 JULY 1958

                                  Section III
                        The Landing--D-Day, 15 July 1958

     TransPhibRon 6 consisted of five ships:  the command ship (AGC), the 
TACONIC; an Attack transport (APA), the MONROVIA; an attack cargo ship (AKA), 
the CAPRICORNUS; and two LSTs (Landing Ship, Tank), the WALWORTH COUNTY and 
the TRAVERSE COUNTY.  Off the coast of Lebanon they were joined by two 
destroyers, THE SULLIVANS and the WADLEIGH, which were to furnish direct fire 
support if the landing were opposed.

     The Marines did not know up to the movement of the landing whether they 
would meet any opposition.  Saeb Salem, the rebel leader in Beirut, was quoted 
as saying:  "You tell those Marines that if one Marine sets foot on the soil 
of my country, I will regard it as an act of aggression and commit my forces 
against them."<2>  The U. S. command was not too concerned, however, about the 
effectiveness of possible rebel resistance.  Although the rebels numbered some 
10,000 irregulars throughout the country, they were dispersed in bands of 400 
to 2,000 men and lightly armed.  There was no central leadership of the 
anti-government forces and each group owed its loyalty only to its individual 
leader.  The Americans did not expect any reaction from the regular Lebanese 
Army though the danger existed that it might disintegrate into pro-government 
and rebel factions.  Therefore, the only immediate effective threat was posed 
by the Syrian First Army, composed of 40,000 men-and equipped with over 200 
T-34 Russian-built medium tanks.  This was why it was so important that the 
airport and the approaches to the north of Beirut be secured.<3>

     Khalde (Red) Beach, the site chosen for the Marine assault was four miles 
from the city of Beirut and 700 yards from the Beirut International Airport.  
The small village of Khalde was located 1,500 yards south of the landing 
beach.  On 15 July, the villagers were going quietly about their chores and a 
gang of workmen was constructing a beach road.  Further along the beach, some 
vacationers were enjoying the sun and others were swimming in the 
Mediterranean.  It was a peaceful scene entirely divorced from revolutions, 
coup d'etas, and the troubles of the cold war.<4>

     In contrast to the mood of serenity on the beach, a sense of urgency was 
present in the offices of President Chamoun, General Chehab, and Robert 
McClintock, the American Ambassador in Beirut.  Ambassador McClintock knew the 
date and time, but not the place of the Marine landing.<5>  He had been in 
communication with both President Chamoun and General Chehab.  The State 
Department had ordered the Ambassador to inform


President Chamoun of the Marine landing no later than 1200 Beirut time on 15 
July.<6>  When McClintock told the President of the proposed American 
intervention, Chamoun asked the Ambassador to relay this information to 
General Chehab.

     Ambassador McClintock then visited General Chehab at 1330, only an hour 
and a half before H-hour.  General Chehab was visibly upset by the news.  The 
day before he had asked the leaders of the rebel forces to take no action in 
the wake of the Iraqi revolt.  The general felt confident that the rebels 
would not precipitate any new maneuvers against the government.<7>  Chehab had 
confided to the American Military Attache that some Lebanese Army officers had 
proposed a coup to him that morning in order to prevent a landing but that he 
had refused.  The Lebanese general claimed he could not guarantee that all the 
Army would remain loyal to him.<8>  He feared the American intervention would 
bring about the dissolution of the army and prevent any settlement of the 
revolt.<9>  General Chehab asked Ambassador McClintock to request the Marines 
to remain on board their ships.  The ships then could enter Beirut harbor and 
two or three tanks and some heavy equipment could be unloaded there.  The 
Ambassador agreed to transmit this message to the American amphibious forces 
since he believed that if "General Chehab decided to throw in the sponge, the 
Lebanese army will fall apart."<10>

     Ambassador McClintock then attempted to radio the American fleet, but the 
radio link between the Sixth Fleet and the American Embassy was broken and the 
Ambassador was unable to transmit his message.<11>  He had received word, 
however, from friends who had apartments overlooking the sea that it was 
apparent that the TransPhibRon was approaching the beach area off the airport.  
McClintock then sent the Naval Attache, Commander Howard J. Baker, to 
intercept the advanced units of the assault force.<12>

     At 1430 (Beirut time), a half-hour before H-hour, the seven ships of 
Amphibious Squadron 6 were in position, approximately two miles off Red Beach.  
Shortly before 1500, the LVTPs (Landing Vehicles, Tracked, Personnel) were 
launched.  Company F on board the LVTPs spearheaded the Marine landing.  The 
amphibian tractors reached the shoreline at 1504 and rumbled onto the 
airfield.  Companies G and H came ashore in landing craft and deployed on foot 
to their assigned objectives.  Company E followed as the battalion reserve.

     The scene on the beach was perhaps one of the most colorful in the long 
history of Marine Corps landings.  Witnessing the assault were 
bikini-clad-sunbathers, Khalde villagers that had galloped on horseback to the 
site, and the beach workmen who had dropped their tools and had run to the 
shore.  As the fully armed Marines charged over the sand, these civilian 
observers waved and some even cheered.  A few of the young



                                     MAP 3
                 MARINE LANDINGS AND OBJECTIVES 15-19 JULY 1958

boys even attempted to help the Marines in bringing ashore some of the heavier 
equipment.  Soft drink vendors were out in full force.  The Marines were 
prepared for any eventuality, but this reception was rather unexpected.  As 
one Marine said, "It's better than Korea, but what the hell is it?"<13>

     Quickly taking control, all four rifle companies of 2/2 and the advance 
echelon of the command post landed within 20 minutes.  As Company E cleared 
the civilians from the beach, Company G secured the airport terminal, and 
Companies F and H began to establish their positions about the airfield.  The 
two destroyers and Navy planes from the aircraft carrier ESSEX stood by to 
support the Marine troops ashore.  No incidents took place and no shots were 

     At 1520 (Beirut time), Commander Baker arrived at the landing beach.  He 
relayed to Lieutenant Colonel Hadd the wishes of Ambassador McClintock and 
General Chehab that the BLT reembark and then proceed to the Beirut dock area 
and land only its tanks.<15>  It was 0920 Washington time and President 
Eisenhower had publicly announced the landing of the Marines at 0900 
(Washington time).  The Marines were ashore and preparing their positions.  
Lieutenant Colonel Hadd decided since he was acting under orders of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and the President of the United States, that he had no choice 
but to keep his troops in their present dispositions.  He then referred the 
commander to Captain McCrea in the TACONIC.  Commander Baker who had served a 
tour as an operations officer in an AKA (Amphibious Cargo Ship) "...had no 
illusions that the landing operation could be reversed after some waves had 
already landed and unloaded troops, however it was still considered essential 
that the Commodore (Captain McCrea) received the General's (Chehab) message, 
as it conveyed essential elements of information concerning opposition to be 
expected."  The Naval Attache also recalled later:  "I must admit I felt a 
mite lonely on this particular mission, the only participant making the 
landing in reverse!<16>

     Captain McCrea received Commander Baker and transmitted the following 
message to Ambassador McClintock:

        I am operating under orders from Commander Sixth Fleet and
     Commander in Chief Specific Command Mediterranean who in turn are
     operating under orders U. S. President.  All troops have landed 
     and will remain ashore in vicinity airport until further orders.<17>

The Commander of the Amphibious Squadron then radioed the Commander Sixth 

        ...the Naval Attache came on board and stated Ambassador
      did not wish landing of troops to take


     place and that he wished (the ships to) enter outer harbor and land
     only heavy equipment.  I am continuing landing as directed.<18>

Admiral Brown replied:  "Your action approved....Decision to use beach or 
harbor belongs to the commander on the scene."<19>

     To complicate the situation even further, reports reached President 
Chamoun that he was to be assassinated at 1500, 15 July.  He requested 
Ambassador McClintock to send a Marine company to guard the Presidental Palace 
in Beirut.  The Ambassador sent his assistant military attache, Major Melvin  
B. Hayes, to transmit this message to the Marine commander.  Major Hayes 
arrived at Lieutenant Colonel Hadd's command post 30 minutes after Commander 
Baker had left for the TACONIC.  The major relayed the Ambassador's request 
and asked for a 100-man detail to guard the palace.  Hadd considered that his  
battalion was "extended to the maximum and the situation was still too obscure 
to risk fragmentizing the command <20>  He, did, however, transmit Major 
Hayes' request to Captain McCrea and asked for instructions.  At 1722, the 
battalion commander received word to furnish the detail.  By this time, 
General Chehab had promised the Ambassador that the Lebanese Army would 
guarantee the safety of the President and that the Marines were not needed.  
Lieutenant Colonel Hadd, nevertheless, has stated that if the request had not 
been rescinded, he would have had to inform Captain McCrea that "the Marines 
could not comply  with the order...."  The battalion had already secured an 
extensive defense perimeter and lacked proper shore party support.  In 
addition, the Presidential Palace was located right next to the Basta, the 
stronghold of the rebels, and there was no guarantee that the Lebanese Army 
could cooperate with the Marines.<21>

     On the beach, Company E, after clearing the civilians out of the area, 
began unloading supplies.  At the terminal, Company G had halted all incoming 
and outgoing air traffic.  The other two companies of the battalion continued 
to improve their positions about the airfield.  The Lebanese airport guards 
were replaced by Marines without incident, and the forward command post was 
placed, near the north-south runway.

     The U. S. Air Attache, Colonel Joseph C. Holbrook, arrived at the airport 
at 1640 and arranged for a meeting between Lieutenant Colonel Hadd and the 
Lebanese Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Toufic Salem.  During this conference, 
which concerned liaison arrangements that were to be made with the Lebanese 
authorities, Colonel Salem was in communication with Lebanese Army 
headquarters by telephone as was Hadd with Ambassador McClintock.  The two 
officers agreed that the airport guards would assist the Marines in guarding 
the Beirut International Airport.  Normal air traffic was to be permitted so 
long as it  was approved by a designated Lebanese air officer and a Marine


Corps officer.  The Lebanese officials were to clear the terminal of all 
civilians, and the Marine companies were to remain 500 yards from the Lebanese 
Army barracks in the vicinity.  The Marines were not to disturb Lebanese 
roadblocks so long as these obstacles did not hinder the Marine mission.  
Ambassador McClintock had earlier in the day requested Lieutenant Colonel Hadd 
and Captain McCrea to meet with him at the American Embassy in Beirut.  Such a 
meeting was delayed, however, because none of the three wished to leave his 
post.  Lieutenant Colonel Hadd wanted to remain with his troops until they had 
established their positions;  Ambassador McClintock believed that he could not 
leave Beirut as he was in constant contact with General Chehab and President 
Chamoun; and Captain McCrea, as senior U. S. military officer present in 
Lebanon, deemed his place to be on board the command ship TACONIC.  Sometime 
after 1800, Hadd and McCrea, in separate visits to the Embassy, did meet with 
the Ambassador.<22>  These two conferences helped to resolve the various 
misunderstandings and provided a basis for liaison between the American 
Ambassador and the military commanders.


                                   Section IV
                              The Move Into Beirut

     With the successful completion of the landing and the consolidation of 
the Marine positions at the airfield, the more dramatic aspects of the first 
day ended.  Still the difficult task of unloading the ships and establishing 
supply dumps ashore remained.  This effort was to take the rest of the night.  
Red Beach was not the most ideal site for the unloading operation.  The 
wheeled vehicles were unable to move over the soft sand and a sandbar located 
offshore prevented beaching of the LSTs.  The information about the coast and 
landing beaches of Lebanon available to the amphibious squadrons were not as 
complete as it should have been, but the problems that arose could not have 
been so all-absorbing if the LSD PLYMOUTH ROCK had been available to the 

     There was need for an underwater demolition team (UDT) to breach the 
sandbar.  No shore party was present to emplace a pontoon causeway from the 
beach to the LSTs and to lay down beach matting to facilitate the movement of 
vehicles.  There were no cranes to unload the supplies and equipment from the 
landing craft.  Both the men and equipment of the shore party and UDT 
supporting BLT 2/2 were on board the PLYMOUTH ROCK.

     The Marines and Navy were forced to improvise.  Company E and a hastily 
formed shore party from the MONROVIA manhandled the supplies from the landing 
craft onto the beach.<2>  LVTPs, Ontos, a bulldozer, and five mechanical mules 
were used to carry the material from the waterline to the temporary supply 
depots inland.<3>  The versatile mules proved to be extremely effective in 
negotiating the loose sand.  They hauled over 75 tons of ammunition during the 
first 24 hours ashore.

     At 2000, 15 July, the FORT SNELLING, the LSD assigned to BLT 3/6, 
arrived.  The UDT came ashore immediately and searched for the best site to 
beach the LCU (Landing Craft, Utility) carrying the shore party and its heavy 
equipment.  The LCU became hung up on the sandbar, however, and did not reach 
the beach until 0230 the next morning.  The shore party disembarked and a 
pontoon causeway was emplaced from the beach to the LST TRAVERSE COUNTY.  
Immediately thereafter, the trucks and three tanks belonging to BLT 2/2 rolled 
off the ship across the floating bridge onto the shore.

     The five tanks of BLT 3/6 on board the FORT SNELLING were then loaded 
onto the LCU, which carried them to them to the beach.  Upon their arrival, 
they were attached to BLT 2/2.  These tanks arrived short of ammunition.  
Because of peacetime safety


regulations, the ammunition was not loaded on the LSD.  This stowage would 
have caused no problem if the FORT SNELLING had been in support of 3/6 as 
originally planned.  The tank ammunition on board an AKA would have been 
unloaded simultaneously with the landing of the tanks.  But as this was not 
the case, the firepower available to BLT 2/2 was seriously curtailed.

     By 0400 16 July, the shore party from the FORT SNELLING was Operating 
with sufficient equipment to alleviate the unloading problems.  The working 
parties from Company E and the MONROVIA were then relieved from the 
backbreaking job of removing the supplies from the landing craft by hand.  
Wire matting had been placed down on the beach and the task of unloading the 
TRAVERSE COUNTY was completed by 0600.  Lieutenant Colonel Hadd later made the 
observation: "the delay in the beaching of the causeway and the unloading of 
the LSTs would have been disastrous if the landing had been opposed."<4>  That 
statement dramatized the political nature of the Lebanon operation.  Military 
logistical effectiveness on this first day of the landing had to be sacrificed 
in order to meet the time limits of President Eisenhower's announcement.  
Speed and surprise were the essential considerations, as the possibility of 
organized armed opposition at the time of the landing was remote.

     As the supplies were being unloaded onto the beach, the Marines at the 
airport were consolidating their positions.  By nightfall on the 15th, the 
defense perimeter had been adjusted to provide the most effective security.  
Liaison had been established with the Lebanese units at the airport and 
certain areas there were guarded jointly by Marines and Lebanese.  A motorized 
platoon from Company E was placed in a standby position with orders to 
proceed, if necessary into Beirut to protect the American, French, or British 
Embassies.  At 2100, 15 July, a member of the U. N. observer team in Lebanon 
approached the command post of BLT 2/2.  He asked the battalion commander 
which side the U. S. forces were supporting.  The Marine officer replied that 
his battalion was there to give assistance to the legal government of Lebanon.  
The U. N. official then implied that the U. S. was backing the wrong side.  
Lieutenant Colonel Hadd asked the observer very politely to leave the area.

     Small patrols from the Marine companies were sent forward to probe for 
any irregular Lebanese armed groups that might be in the immediate area of the 
airport.  These patrols returned to the Marine lines at 0500, 16 July, and 
reported they had made no contact with any hostile forces.

     One hour earlier, Admiral Holloway had arrived at the Beirut airport from 
London.  He went on board the TACONIC after being briefed by Lieutenant 
Colonel Hadd at the airfield.  At 0615, the amphibious squadron carrying BLT 
3/6 arrived off Red Beach.  Included among the vessels of this squadron was


the command ship, the POCONO, with Admiral Yeager and General Wade on board.  
The two officers joined Admiral Holloway in the TACONIC to develop existing 
plans of action.

     At 0730, the first waves of BLT 3/6 landed across Red Beach.  Lieutenant 
Colonel Robert M. Jenkins, the battalion commander, relayed to Hadd an order 
from General Wade for BLT 2/2 to carry out the operational plan to enter the 
city of Beirut.  General Wade left the TACONIC at approximately 0800 to see 
Ambassador McClintock in the city, stopping off en route at the command post 
of 2/2.  Lieutenant Colonel Hadd told General Wade that the battalion could be 
formed up in a column and ready to move at 0930.  General Wade then left with 
an official from the American Embassy to meet the Ambassador.

     When the general arrived at the Embassy, Ambassador McClintock was 
speaking on the telephone to General Chehab.  The Lebanese general was asking 
the Ambassador to halt the proposed movement of the American Marines into the 
city.  Both the Ambassador and General Chehab were concerned that units of the 
Lebanese Army might resist the Marine column.  The Ambassador told General 
Chehab that he would speak to President Chamoun about the situation and then 
asked General bade to hold up BLT 2/2.  General Wade replied that he had no 
authority to cancel the order but that he would postpone the troop movement.  
He sent an order to Hadd to hold up his troops, and then transmitted a message 
to Admiral Holloway on board the TACONIC concerning the new developments.  At 
0900, BLT 3/6 relieved BLT 2/2 at the airport and attached 11 LVTPs to 
Lieutenant Colonel Hadd's battalion.  Thirty minutes later, BLT 2/2 was 
prepared to move out when the military attache at the American Embassy relayed 
General Wade's order by phone.

     General Wade and Ambassador McClintock, in the meantime, went to see 
President Chamoun.  The Marine told the President of the plan to enter the 
city and Chamoun agreed that the plan should be, executed immediately.  
McClintock and Wade returned to the Embassy where the Ambassador then called 
General Chehab.<5>  Chehab requested that General Wade hold up the Marine 
column for another 30 minutes.  General Wade agreed and ordered Hadd to 
prepare to get under way at 1030.

     An aide informed General Wade that a detachment of Lebanese Army tanks 
had set up a roadblock on the main road leading from the airport into Beirut.  
The general immediately informed the Ambassador of the new turn of events. 
Ambassador McClintock replied that he would speak to General Chehab. General 
Wade then procured an Embassy car and proceeded towards the airport 
accompanied by two interpreters.

     On the way, the general's car pulled up alongside one of the Lebanese 
tanks, a French-built medium armed with a 75mm gun, parked on the side of the 
road and General Wade spoke to one



             Landing of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines at Red Beach.


of the Lebanese crewmen.  In response to a question from the American general, 
the Lebanese soldier replied that he had orders to stop any movement into the 
city.  He also volunteered the information that he had a cousin in New York.  
General Wade then asked him if he would fire upon the American Marines.  The 
soldier replied that he had no such orders but would have to check with his 

     General Wade then drove on to the airport.  He told Lieutenant Colonel 
Hadd that it was his opinion that the Lebanese would not fire at the Marines, 
but that the battalion should proceed with caution and be prepared for any 
eventuality.  At 1030, as the BLT was about to start out a Lebanese captain 
approached Lieutenant Colonel Hadd and General Wade.  The Lebanese officer 
stated that he had received a telephone call from General Chehab.  The 
Lebanese general and the American Ambassador were in conference and requested 
that the Marines wait another 30 minutes before starting towards Beirut.  
General Wade agreed to the request and postponed the movement until 1100.

     The Marine general then intended to go see Admiral Holloway and advise 
him of the situation ashore.  As General Wade was about to leave, he received 
orders to wait at the airport for Admiral Holloway and Admiral Yeager who 
would join him there.  Admiral Holloway upon his arrival expressed a desire to 
consult with Ambassador McClintock.  The general and the two admirals entered 
General Wade's borrowed car, which took them towards the city.

     At 1100, the Marines of BLT 2/2 boarded their tanks, LVTPs,and trucks, 
and moved out in column formation.  Lieutenant Colonel Hadd halted his 
battalion in front of the Lebanese roadblock, one mile up from the airport.  
The guns of the Lebanese tanks were pointed directly at the lead vehicles in 
the Marine column.

     While Admiral Holloway, General Wade, and Admiral Yeager were heading 
into Beirut, the Ambassador's car, with Ambassador McClintock and General 
Chehab inside, sped by going in the opposite direction, accompanied by a 
motorcycle escort.  The American officers' car quickly swerved about and gave 
chase.  Both automobiles arrived almost simultaneously at the roadblock where 
the Lebanese troops and American Marines faced one another.

     General Chehab suggested that the American Ambassador, the two admirals, 
and the Marine general accompany him to a small schoolhouse located a short 
distance from the road to discuss the confrontation between the Marine BLT and 
the Lebanese unit.  Thus began the conference that was to settle the role the 
Marines were to play in Lebanon.


     As this meeting took place on the main road, a second dangerous incident 
occurred in the sector of BLT 3/6.  Companies I and K had secured their 
objectives, respectively to the east and south of the airport, without 
incident.  In contrast, Company L was unable to reach its objective, located 
two miles due north of the airfield on a beach road, since the position was 
occupied by a Lebanese armored detachment.  (See Map 3).  The Marines had been 
instructed to consider all Lebanese Army units friendly unless proven 
otherwise.  With this in mind, Captain Richard W. Coulter, Commanding Officer 
of Company L, halted his troops and advanced towards the Lebanese, accompanied 
only by his first sergeant.  The two Marines were immediately surrounded by 
excited Lebanese troops, who kept their weapons aimed at the two Americans.  
Although the captain and sergeant retained their arms, they were escorted 
under armed guard to a Lebanese Army barracks nearby.  There the captain 
discussed the impasse with an English-speaking Lebanese Army major.  The 
Lebanese officer refused to allow the Marine Company to occupy the position.  
He did agree to release the sergeant, who was to bring back the battalion 

     Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins arrived at the barracks and also was unable to 
convince the Lebanese to retire.  The Lebanese major finally offered to call 
Lebanese Army Headquarters in Beirut to obtain the advice of General Chehab.  
The major was told that General Chehab had just left with the American 
Ambassador to attempt to resolve the difficulties between the Marines and the 
Lebanese Army on the main road to Beirut.  Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins and the 
Lebanese major then made the decision that Company L and the Lebanese troops 
blocking its path would remain in their present positions while the major and 
Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins attempted to find General Chehab.  Captain Coulter 
returned to his company while the other two officers made their way to the 
Lebanese roadblock on the main road.

      There the conference at the schoolhouse was still going on.  General 
Chehab asked that the Marines take a different route into the city.  General 
Wade refused, however, and insisted that the Marine BLT be allowed to complete 
its mission.  He stated that time was an important factor and there had been 
enough delays.  Admiral Holloway declared that the Marine column would move 
out without any further delay at 1200.<6>  Ambassador McClintock resolved the 
issue by suggesting that General Chehab, Admiral Holloway, and himself ride 
together leading the Marines into Beirut but that they bypass the Moslem 
quarter, the Basta.  This proposal proved agreeable to all parties and 
arrangements for the formation of the column were then ironed out.  It was 
decided that BLT 2/2 should be broken down into small sections.  Each section  
was to be led by a jeep carrying Lebanese Army officers.  Company H in the 
lead, was to be divided into three sections.  Each section was to be 
transported by three vehicles--a tank and two LVTPs.   At 1230, the column 
began to move with



     CONFERENCE AT THE ROADBLOCK.  General Chehab stands in the center of the 
picture, facing the camera and speaking to Ambassador McClintock, dressed in a 
business suit with his back to the camera.  Admiral Holloway is to the right 
of the admiral.  Admiral Yeager is to the left of the Ambassador.


the Ambassador's car leading the Marines towards Beirut.

     Once the BLT entered the city, Chehab got out of the lead car and Admiral 
Holloway ordered all intervals closed as the movement was bogging down.  The 
admiral, assisted by Admiral Yeager and General Wade, assumed personal 
tactical command...and even directed the units of the column to their 
billeting areas from the main gate of the dock area.<7>  The Marines took 
control of the dock area, protected the bridges over the Beirut River on the 
Tripoli road, and furnished guards for the American Embassy and the 
Ambassador's residence.  By 1900, the BLT had secured its objectives.

     After the crisis between BLT 2/2 and the Lebanese troops was resolved, 
Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins was able to settle the differences between Company 
L and the Lebanese Army detachment on the beach road.  Liaison arrangements 
were made and Jenkins then returned to his command post at the Beirut airport.  
Awaiting him there was a message from the Lebanese commander of the airport, 
who requested that the Marine officer meet with him at 1300 to discuss 
arrangements at the airfield.  Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins arrived at 
approximately 1310 at the commander's office.  There he was greeted by the 
commander's aide, who informed the American that the commander had tired of 
waiting and had departed for lunch.  The aide then told Jenkins that he should 
return in 30 minutes and the airport commander would furnish orders for the 
disposition of the Marines.  Upon hearing this, the BLT commander stated that 
he would return at 1600 with orders for the disposition of the Lebanese troops 
at the airfield.  The Marine won his point, and an effective liaison with the 
Lebanese authorities at the airport was established.

     This incident reflected the Marines' conception of their assignment.  
They were to be cooperative but firm.  The Marines aided by the mediation of 
Ambassador McClintock and General Chehab, were able to handle the very 
critical situation posed by the Lebanese roadblocks.  The harassing maneuvers 
of a few Lebanese soldiers ceased, and the Marines were able to proceed with 
their mission.


                                   Section V
                     The Continuing Mission and Withdrawal

     The Marines of BLT 2/2 in Beirut and BLT 3/6 at the airport spent a 
relatively peaceful night on 16-17 July.  The only disturbances were small 
probing attacks by Lebanese rebels against forward Marine outposts.  At 1800 
and 2055, 16 July, groups of four to five Lebanese sniped at the Marine 
outpost south of the airfield but withdrew once the Marines returned the fire.  
The rebels came fain at 0600, 17 July and retreated once more in the face of 
Marine rifle fire.  There were no casualties on either side as a result of 
these actions.

     During the morning of 17 July, two Marines of BLT 2/2 were "captured" by 
rebel forces in the Basta area.  The two men took a wrong turn in Beirut on 
their way to pick up some equipment at Red Beach and entered the Moslem 
section of the city.  They were immediately surrounded by armed Lebanese 
insurgents and forced to surrender their arms.  The Lebanese escorted them to 
a rebel command post, where they were questioned.  The interrogator asked the 
two Marines why they had come to Lebanon.  The two Americans, not wishing to 
provoke their captors, replied they did not know.  Thereupon the Lebanese 
rebel leader proceeded to lecture them about the "duplicity" of American 
foreign policy and the evil of American "imperialism".  After an hour and half 
of this harangue, the two Marines were released.  A Lebanese Army captain 
escorted them back to their battalion.  Later in the day, the Lebanese Army 
returned the Marine jeep and the weapons of the two Americans.

     These harassing maneuvers employed by the Lebanese rebels were to become 
commonplace.  The Lebanese dissidents were attempting to provoke the Marines 
into rash retaliation, but were unsuccessful.  The Marine forces were under 
strict orders to maintain fire discipline, and to shoot only in self-defense.

     In order to further Lebanese Army and Marine cooperation, General Wade 
visited General Chehab on 17 July, at the latter's quarters in Juniyah, 10 
miles north of Beirut.  In the course of their conversation, General Wade 
indicated that he did not wish to become involved in the Lebanese internal 
political situation.  General Chehab replied that he understood General Wade's 
position and would discuss only military matters.  It was not possible, 
however, to divorce entirely the military presence of the Marines in Lebanon 
from the political implications.  Chehab stated that his army would fall apart 
if the Marines continued their movements into the city.  The Lebanese general 
asked General Wade to group the American force: in such a manner that the 
Marines would not give the appearance of being occupation troops.  The Marine 
general agreed to this


request.  General Wade considered that the most important result of this 
conference with General Chehab was the agreement to attach Lebanese Army 
officers to the headquarters staff of the 2d Provisional Marine Force and to 
each of the Marine battalions.

    Lebanese Major Alexander Ghanem, attached to General Wade's headquarters, 
proved to be extremely useful to the Americans.  According to Colonel Hamilton 
Lawrence, Chief of Staff of the 2d provisional Marine Force:

        Was there a roadblock someplace manned by oddly dressed
     irregulars?  Ghanem would consider the problem silently for a
     minute while seated by the phone, his fingertips pressed together.
     Course of action decided, he would pick up the phone and speak 
     softly into it for only a few seconds.  Fifteen minutes later our
     reporting unit would call and say the roadblock had melted away
     after a few words from some visiting Lebanese.<2>

     The Lebanese officer who was attached to 2/2 requested Lieutenant Colonel 
Hadd to withdraw Companies E and F from their positions at the bridges over 
the Beirut river and at the eastern approaches to the city.  Units of the 
Lebanese Army also guarded these locations in the city, and Lebanese Army 
officers believed the presence of the two Marine companies at these same sites 
would mean a loss of face to the Lebanese Army.  The Lebanese feared, in 
addition, that the Marines might engage rebel elements that were firing 
sporadically at the Marine emplacements in these areas.  Hadd agreed to the 
withdrawal after consulting with American Embassy officials and moved both 
companies into the dock section of Beirut.  He made it clear, however, that 
these new positions were not satisfactory as a permanent location.

     On 18 July, the Lebanese Army permitted the Marines to station Companies 
E and F of 2/2 at J'Daide, approximately a mile and a half to the east of 
Beirut.  From there, both units would be able to move rapidly to the bridges 
and to the eastern approaches of the city if the occasion arose.

     At 0900, 18 July, the third battalion of the 2d Provisional Marine Force, 
BLT 1/8 under Lieutenant Colonel John H. Brickley, landed at Yellow Beach, 
four miles north of Beirut.  Companies A and B came ashore in landing craft 
and Company C, the battalion reserve, followed in LVTPs.<3>  The battalion 
fanned out and formed a crescent-shaped perimeter with Company B on the right 
flank, Company C on the left, and Company A in the center to protect the 
beachhead and the northern approaches to the city.  The only problems 
encountered were those posed by the usual congregation of Lebanese spectators 
and ice cream and watermelon vendors.  One or two of the Navy landing craft 
had to swerve in order to avoid some children swimming in the water.


As one reporter stated, "The whole operation had a smooth picnic look about 

     The three Marine landings in Lebanon were only part of the American 
response to the crisis in the Middle East caused by the sudden eruption of the 
Iraqi Revolution.  The United States could not be sure how other nations would 
react to the American intervention and had to be prepared for any eventuality.

     On 14 and 15 July, plans were being made to provide for the assignment of 
the entire 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune and the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing 
at Cherry Point, North Carolina to the Mediterranean area.  In the Far East, 
BLT 3/3 on Okinawa was ordered to load on board an amphibious squadron and 
sail into the Persian Gulf and to be prepared to land in Iran or Saudi Arabia 
in the event the crisis spread.  A regimental landing team, RLT-3 on Okinawa, 
was placed on a standby alert status.

     The original plan, which called for the airlift of a British brigade into 
the Beirut airport, had to be revised in view of the agreement of 15 July 
between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold MacMillan that the 
British forces remain in reserve on Cyprus.<5>  Subsequently on 17 July, 
British paratroops landed in Jordan at the request of King Hussein of that 
country.  The role of the British brigade in BLUEBAT was taken instead by the 
European-based 24th Airborne Brigade of the U. S. Army under Brigadier General 
David W. Gray.  The U. S. Army in Europe had prepared in November 1957 and 
revised in February 1958 an emergency plan for the commitment of Army troops 
in the Middle East.  This plan provided for employment of an Army task force 
consisting of two airborne battle groups reinforced with support elements.  
Composed of five forces code named Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, and Echo, the 
task force had been organized to permit deployment in whole or in part.  Force 
Alpha was comprised of the first battle group and task force command group.  
The second battle group made up Force Bravo.  The other three elements 
consisted of combat and service support units.

     At 0330 local time, 15 July, Force Alpha, the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 
187th Infantry, was placed on alert.  Two hours later the battle group was 
ordered to move to Fuerstenfeldbruck Aid Force Base in Bavaria at 1300 for 
further deployment to the Mediterranean theater.<6>  The U. S. Air Forces in 
Europe was to provide the necessary lift.

     The Air Force had also been prepared for a Mediterranean operation.  On 
16 July a Composite Air Strike Force, made up largely of B-57s and F-100s 
flown from the United States, was formed at the Air Force base in Adana, 
Turkey under the overall command of CinCSPECOMME.<7>  Adana, located in south 


Turkey, was also the staging area for the airborne battle group, which arrived 
at the airbase on 17 July.  The transports carrying the Army troops were then 
under the operational control of the Air Force commander, Brigadier General 
James E. Roberts, who in turn reported to Admiral Holloway.<8>  Force Alpha 
was not flown into the Beirut airport until 19 July.

     The Marine Corps was preparing its own airlift.  The CNO, Admiral Burke, 
had decided on the 15th to reinforce the 2d Provisional Marine Force with a 
battalion from Camp Lejeune.  The 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, under the command 
of Lieutenant Colonel Alfred A. Tillman, had been alerted for possible mount 
out at 1915 (Washington time), 14 July.  During 15 July, the Marines were 
transported by trucks and buses to the Marine Air Station at Cherry Point.  
There at 1200 (Washington time), the order came from Admiral Burke to fly the 
battalion to Beirut.

      Twelve R5D aircraft arrived from the West Coast to augment the 14 R4Q-2 
transports at Cherry Point.<9>  At 1815 (Washington time) the last echelons of 
2/8 reached Cherry Point and at 2210 (Washington time), the first plane was 
airborne.  The aircraft initially departed at 10-minute intervals, later 
15-minute intervals, and eventually 30-minute intervals.  The last plane left 
at 1535, 16 July.  After short refueling stops at Argentia, Newfoundland and 
Lajes in the Azores, the aircraft headed for Port Lyautey, Morocco.  The U. S. 
Naval Air Station near this Moroccan city, located about 150 miles south of 
Gibralter along the Atlantic coast, was the main air transport support base 
for the Sixth Fleet.  From there, the Marine aircraft carrying the battalion 
departed every 30 minutes for Beirut.  The first plane touched down at the 
Beirut International Airport at 0930 (Beirut time), 18 July.  The Marines of 
2/8 were at first assigned to aid in the general unloading and were quartered 
on board the USS CHILTON.  The command post of the battalion, however, was 
established in the rear area of BLT 3/6.

     The entire airlift operation went smoothly with the exception, of one R4Q 
that developed engine trouble and returned to Lajes.  The Marines on board the 
aircraft transferred to a U. S. Air Force C-124, which carried them on to 
Beirut.<10>  A Marine battalion of approximately 800 men had been airlifted 
from North Carolina to Lebanon in 26 transports.  This was a remarkable feat 
considering the slowness of the R4Qs and R5D sand their limited range.  Of the 
54 hours en route, approximately 34 were spent in the air.

      Preparations continued at Camp Lejeune to reinforce the Marine 
contingents in Lebanon.  Regimental Landing Team 6 (RLT-6), composed of two 
BLTs, and Marine Aircraft Group 26 (NAG-26) moved to Morehead City on 16 July 
for further deployment.  The MAG was to be loaded on board the aircraft 
carrier ANTIETAM and two victory ships were chartered to carry the RLT.  The 
latter two vessels were not prepared, however, to pick up the


two BLTs until 18 July.  MAG-26 and RLT-6 completed loading on 21 July.  On 
this date, the decision was made to send the ships, not to Beirut but to 
Vieques Island, nine miles east of Puerto Rico, for maneuvers.  The reason for 
this change of orders was based on Admiral Holloway's situation reports.

     On the 19th, the Admiral had reported:

        Time is still operating for us rather than against us.  The 
     moment may come when this is reversed but at present, patience,
     consolidation of strength, acclimating the Lebanese to our presence,
     and restraint characterized our actions accompanied by our great
     potential military strength are paying dividends.<11>

Holloway indicated also that space ashore in Lebanon was becoming scarce.  
Earlier, President Eisenhower had signified that he was not in favor of any 
further sizeable reinforcement of American forces in Lebanon.  This line of 
reasoning, based on the desire not to over-commit American power, applied also 
to the movement of BLT 3/3 from Okinawa to the Persian Gulf.  The State 
Department had expressed fear that a large transfer of American forces from 
the Far East to the Middle-East theaters might provoke a new emergency.  As 
the crisis in Lebanon receded, BLT 3/3 returned to its base.  The CNO decided 
to send one BLT with a regimental headquarters to the Mediterranean as a 
floating reserve once RLT-6 returned from Vieques.

     In Lebanon, after the arrival of the Army troops on 19 July, the problem 
of command of the American land forces arose.  On the day of the Marine 
Landing, General Wade was assigned as Commander, American Land Forces, 
Lebanon, with headquarters on board the Pocono.  When General Gray's 24th 
Airborne Brigade arrived, the Army general became Commander, U. S. Army Troops 
Assigned, Lebanon.  The soldiers of the 1st Airborne Group were placed in 
reserve, and occupied the olive groves just east of the airport.  On 21 July, 
Admiral Holloway requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to have a major general 
or lieutenant general of either the Army or the Marine Corps assigned to 
coordinate the activities of the two forces.  The Marine Corps had expected 
that Lieutenant General Edwin A. Pollock, Commanding General, Fleet Marine 
Force, Atlantic, would be made the American land commander.  Apparently the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided to appoint an Army commander, however, since 
the Army troops in Lebanon would soon outnumber the Marines now that the 
decision had been made not to reinforce the Marine force.  The Department of 
the Army on 23 July named Major General Paul D. Adams, Commander in Chief,  
American Land Forces, Lebanon.  General Adams arrived in Lebanon on the next 
day.  Although the appointment of an Army general was a disappointment to the 
Marines, General Wade, who was made Commander, U. S. Marine Corps, Troops 
Assigned, Lebanon, later stated:  "I think that General Adams, as commander, 
was as fair to the Marine Corps as any Army general I've ever dealt with."<12>


     The period of 19-26 July, from the arrival of the first Army troops to 
the assumption of command by General Adams, was one of consolidation of 
liaison arrangements with the Lebanese Army.  The relationship between General 
Chehab and the American military improved.  General Wade reminisced:

         He (General Chehab) objected to our coming into the city I
    think because he thought we were going to get involved in the Basta
    area.  When it was quite clear that we were going to avoid that, it
    eased the situation considerably, the tension was lifted and he was
    more or less cooperative.<13>

     During this period there was no combat activity with the exception of the 
continued harassing of Marine forward positions.  One of the most potentially 
dangerous of these incidents occurred on 19 July at the airfield.  Rebel 
groups had periodically been firing at American aircraft when they came in for 
landings.  The rebel shots came from an area just south of the field.  A 
patrol from BLT 3/6 was dispatched to disperse the snipers.  The Marine patrol 
became involved in a three-cornered fire fight, not only with the rebels but 
also with Lebanese police dressed in civilian clothes.  There were no American 
casualties, although one gendarme was wounded.  A later investigation proved 
that the Lebanese gendarmes had initiated the firing, mistaking the Marines 
for rebels.  A Lebanese Army unit moved into the area and stopped the rebel 
harassment of the American planes.

     On 21 July, General Wade, accompanied by the airborne commander, met once 
again with General Chehab.  The three made arrangements for Lebanese officers 
to be assigned to the 24th Airborne Brigade staff.  More importantly, it was 
agreed to form an integrated military police force composed of Lebanese, and 
American Army, Navy, and Marine personnel.  General Chehab emphasized his 
desire that only the Lebanese Army cope with the problem of the Basta area.  
He stated that Lebanese units were to be placed between U. S. and rebel 
positions in order to prevent any clashes between the two.  The American 
forces were in the unusual predicament of having to negotiate in order to 
establish their positions in lieu of seizing them.

     Two days after this conference, BLT 1/8 received permission to institute 
motorized patrols.  Air support for these patrols was furnished by the eight 
Marine HRS-3 helicopters from Sub Unit 1, Detachment HMR-262, under Major 
Samuel F. Roach, which had arrived in Lebanon on 19 July from the aircraft 
carrier WASP.<14>

     The patrols reconnoitered up to 20 miles east of the position of 1/8 
north of the city.  Each patrol was made up of a reinforced rifle platoon, a 
forward air controller, an artillery forward observer, and the communications 


necessary to call air and artillery strikes.  A helicopter flew above the 
three 2 1/2 ton trucks and three jeeps of each patrol, maintaining a 
surveillance of the road ahead.  Several Lebanese Army personnel accompanied 
the Marines as interpreters and guides.  The patrols met no resistance and 
received an extremely friendly reception from the rural populace.  On one 
occasion, a helicopter was forced to land at a Christian monastery.  According 
to the pilots:

        Monks, children, and old timers came running out to greet us
     like lost relatives, some brought gifts of fruit, cold drinks,
     and one offered us wine.  All of them showered us with hospitality.
     We've never seen anything like it.<15>

     After the 19th, the U. S. Army began to reinforce the original battle 
group.  Lead elements of Force Charlie arrived at the Beirut airport on 20 
July.  On the 22d, the 3d Medium Tank Battalion departed from Bremerhaven, 
Germany, by ship for Lebanon.  Force Delta sailed from Bremerhaven and La 
Pallice, in southern France on 26 and 27 July.  The major components of 
Charlie and Delta consisted of the force artillery, a signal support company, 
two engineer battalions, an evacuation hospital, a military police company, 
and three transportation companies.

     General Adams arrived in Beirut on 24 July and assumed command on 26 
July.  General Wade offered him the use of the American Community School in 
the northern sector of Beirut as headquarters for the joint staff.  The 
building had previously been used by administrative sections of the 2d 
Provisional Marine Force for billeting personnel and office space.  The 
Marines moved their administrative staff into another school located in the 
eastern portion of the city between the Basta and the Beirut River.<16>  The 
primary Marine headquarters, however, remained aboard the POCONO.  Because of 
considerations of communications and space, the unusual situation existed of a 
rear headquarters located forward of the actual command post.

     With the increased Army strength in Lebanon, it was necessary to make 
further refinements in the disposition of the Army and Marine forces.  The 
Marines of 2/8, who had disembarked from the CHILTON on 23 July and proceeded 
to an assembly area east of Beirut, relieved BLT 2/2 on 26 July of guarding 
the dock area and key installations in the city.  The rest of BLT2/2 moved out 
to join Companies E and F in a defense perimeter at J'Daide.  Each battalion 
made arrangements with the Lebanese to furnish guides to point out rebel 
strongpoints.  Planning was carefully irked out to prevent any 
misunderstanding with the Lebanese authorities.  The two battalions entered 
their new positions without any undue ramifications.



     A Marine motorized patrol in the hills of Lebanon with a Marine 
helicopter flying reconnaissance.


     On 29 July, the Army battle group relieved BLT 3/6 at the Beirut 
International Airport.  The Army troops then assumed the responsibility for 
protecting the southern sector of the American defense perimeter, which 
included the airport, the high ground to the south, and Red Beach.  BLT 3/6 
redeployed through Beirut to the southern flank of 1/8, north or the city.

     This latter battalion had remained in its original positions since 
landing.  During this time, Lieutenant Colonel Brickley had his men improve 
their field fortifications.  It was necessary to construct bunkers by blasting 
because much of the surface of the ground in this sector consisted of solid 
rock.  The Marines of BLT 1/8 used nearly 23,000 sandbags to reinforce the 108 
different emplacements erected by the battalion.

     By the end of July, the Army and Marines had consolidated their final 
dispositions.  A defense perimeter extending for 20 miles protected Beirut 
from attack in any direction.  The main problems for the American force were 
the avoidance of conflict with the local Lebanese irregulars and the provision 
of the necessary staff, logistical, and combat support of the American land 
force in Lebanon.

     From the very beginning of the Lebanon operations, these latter 
considerations were of great concern to the Marines.  The headquarters 
personnel of the 2d Provisional Marine Force on the day of the first landing 
consisted of only 13 officers and 31 enlisted men.  The staff was increased to 
52 officers and 211 enlisted men on 17 July.  Through a preplanned 
augmentation, more than 100 officers and enlisted men had arrived by air from 
the United States.  Additional personnel were drawn from the battalions to 
bring the staff up to adequate strength.<17>  When the joint Army-Marine 
command was formed under General Adams on 26 July, the Marines in the 
headquarters were a small minority.  This was due not to any exclusion policy 
established by General Adams, but to a scarcity of immediately available 
Marine staff officers.  The Marines were in important positions, however, as 
not only the Chief of Staff, Colonel Charles M. Nees, was a Marine but also 
key members of the operations and intelligence staffs.

     Logistics presented another vexing problem to the Marine forces.  A 
Logistics Support Group was formed by the 2d Provisional Marine Force on 18 
July.  The personnel of this group came from the service support elements of 
the BLTs.  The group headquarters, however, had to be formed from officers 
airlifted from the U. S.  According to the final report of the 2d Provisional 
Marine Force:  "This did not permit prior planning and organization, and only 
a hasty estimate and familiarization with the situation ashore was possible 
before actual activation."<18>


     One of the first tasks was to find storage for the supplies unloaded from 
the transports and the LSDs.  On 17 July, agreements had been made with the 
Lebanese port authorities for open and covered storage at the dock area of 
Beirut.  This space was inadequate, however, and the Force Supply Officer 
arranged for additional open storage area at the railroad marshalling yards, 
located in the southern section of the city.  After the unloading of the 
amphibious shipping on 23 July, the Logistical Support Group undertook a 
review of its storage space ashore.  The survey indicated a need for greater 
dispersion of the supply installations.  Admiral Holloway assigned to the 2d 
Provisional Marine Force a naval officer with experience in contracting.  His 
negotiations, which produced seven contracts and six leases with Lebanese 
merchants, provided the additional required space.  All in all, 10,000 tons of 
supplies were brought ashore by the Marine battalions.  In addition to the 
supplies brought in by ship, medical stores, ammunition, and other critical 
items were flown in day and night by a MAG-35 detachment, whose 10 R4Qs and 
crews had been stationed at Port Lyautey since May.  Admiral Holloway 
complimented the unit highly for its cooperation and efficiency in support of 
the SPECOMME forces.

     The main transportation headache of the Marine forces was the shortage of 
trucks.  A central motor pool was created from the trucks assigned to the 
individual battalions.  Each BLT retained only what was necessary for 
day-to-day operations.  Even so, the Marine force had to depend on the Army 
Logistical Command for approximately 10 additional vehicles daily.  During the 
round-the-clock unloading of the ships, it was necessary to borrow 30 Army 
trucks for each 12-hour shift.

     For medical support after 29 July, the Marines were dependent upon the 
facilities of the Army 58th Evacuation Hospital.  Prior to that time, the 
Marine medical force consisted of three medical aid stations with a total of 
five general medical officers.  The USS MOUNT MCKINLEY, the designated 
casualty evacuation ship, had only one medical officer on board.  None of the 
medical officers with the Marines in Lebanon had previous experience or 
training in surgery or anesthesia.  Admiral Yeager made the statement:  "The 
capacity for even major lifesaving emergency surgery was non-existent."<19>  
This situation was relieved by the arrival of three naval surgeons by 27 July 
and with the opening of the Army hospital.

     The biggest medical problem confronting the Marines was the outbreak of 
dysentery among the battalions.  During the period 18-31 July, BLT 1/8 alone 
suffered 48 cases of this malady.  This situation was aggravated because the 
Marines had no preventive medicine team until 31 July.  The Army Engineers 
helped to erect screened toilet facilities for most units, and the Army made 
available large quantities of insecticides to the Marine battalions in order 
to stop the spread of the disease.


By the end or August, strict hygenic controls adopted by the Marine BLTs had 
brought this ailment under control.

     This weakness of the Marine transportation and medical support was 
inherent in the makeup of the Marine task force.  Its main mission was to be a 
striking force.  Accordingly, the Marines were not equipped for an extended 
land campaign.  The service support had to be augmented from other sources.  
The U. S. Army Logistical Command brought into Lebanon to support the Army 
airborne troops was designed to service and equip two Army battle groups.  As 
the second battle group was not committed to Lebanon, the Marines were able to 
rely on the Army to supplement their logistical requirements.  An interesting 
comparison is the contrast between the percentages of support troops in each 
of the two task forces sent into Lebanon.  The Army troops involved in support 
activities consisted of 47.1 percent of the 8,508 Army troops in Lebanon; the 
Marines engaged in such activities made up only 17.2 percent of the 5,790 
Marines of the 2d Provisional Marine Force.

     In combat support, however, the Marines compared favorably with the Army.  
During the first two weeks of the campaign, the only American armor support 
was provided by the 15 medium tanks of the 2d Provisional Marine Force.  These 
tanks were complemented by 31 LVTPs and 10 Ontos.  On 27 July, the 3d Medium 
Tank Battalion arrived from Bremerhaven.  Admiral Holloway had insisted on the 
landing of the tank battalion because he believed the display of American 
armored strength would greatly impress the Lebanese.<20>  The Army battalion 
brought 72 medium tanks and 17 armored personnel carriers.

     The Marine armored vehicles were formed into task forces to "assure the 
flow of military traffic, to protect U. S. officials and property, and to 
concentrate Marines rapidly at any danger point."<21>  Armored teams 
consisting of two to three tanks, three LVTPs, and an infantry platoon were 
deployed from time to time as a show of force.

     The 2d Provisional Marine Force carried its own artillery support into 
Lebanon.  This support was made up of six 8-inch howitzers, eight 4.2-inch 
mortars, and three six-gun 105mm howitzer batteries.  The command of the 
artillery units remained with the individual infantry battalion commanders 
until the activation, on 31 July, of a Force Artillery Group (FAG), which 
provided centralized control.  The personnel of the headquarters of the FAG 
were 7 officers and 23 enlisted men flown to Lebanon from Camp Lejeune.  On 
the same date a provisional battery was formed by drawing two howitzers from 
each 105mm battery to provide general support for the Marine BLTs.  The other 
three 105mm Batteries, Battery B, 1/10, Battery H, 3/10, and Battery I, 3/10, 
were assigned direct support and reinforcing missions.  Batteries H and I 


direct support to BLTs 3/6 and 1/8 north of Beirut while Battery B reinforced 
Battery H and provided forward observers to BLT 2/2 at J'Daide.  Two of the  
8-inch howitzers were assigned to general support of the 2d Provisional Marine 
Force, and the other four were assigned to the Army battle group at the 

     Throughout this period, Marines and Army troops remained in their 
prepared positions.  No liberty was granted until two weeks after the 
landings.  In Beirut, ropes strung across street corners marked off rebel 
areas.  The insurgents continued to fire occasionally at the Americans, but 
the only two Marine deaths resulted from accidental shootings by other 
Marines.  The only American casualties from rebel bullets were two Army 
sergeants, one of whom was wounded and the other killed during the month of 
August.  The American forces in Lebanon were in the difficult position of 
being shot at, but under orders not to shoot back unless they had a clear 
target.  This rebel harassment did serve, according to General Wade, to 
provide "the incentive necessary in constructing good foxholes and 
bunkholes."<22>  This successful restraint of the troops proved to be an 
important stabilizing feature of the American intervention.  Lieutenant 
Colonel Hadd remarked:

        The conduct of the individual Marine in holding his fire when 
     he can see who is shooting in his direction must be mentioned.
     When a youngster lands all prepared and eager to fight and finds
     himself restricted from firing at a known rebel who he sees
     periodically fire in his direction and in every instance restrains
     himself from returning the fire, it is felt this is outstanding and
     indicated good small unit discipline.  The situation had to be
     thoroughly explained to the individual Marine and they understood
     why the restriction on fire was necessary.  Many innocent people
     could have been killed.<23>

General Adams described the military operations in Lebanon as a "show of force 
with psychological overtones."<24>

     From the very beginning of its intervention, the United States, made it 
clear that its main purpose was to protect the integrity of the Lebanese 
government and not to support any internal political faction.  President 
Eisenhower, in his message to Congress on 15 July announcing the Marine 
landings, called upon the United Nations to take effective action to safeguard 
Lebanese independence so that the American troops could be withdrawn.  The 
American Government on this date asked for an immediate meeting of the United 
Nations Security Council to consider the Lebanese situation.  The Japanese 
delegation offered a resolution which would make possible the withdrawal of 
American forces by having the United Nations protect the territorial integrity 
and political independence of Lebanon.  This proposal was vetoed, however, by 
the Soviet Union.


     The U. S. President, realizing the political implications of American 
intervention, sent Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert D. Murphy as 
political adviser to CinCSPECOMME to coordinate the activities of the U. S. 
military command and the American Embassy in Lebanon.  Secretary Murphy 
recalled that the President gave no specific orders except to promote the best 
interest of the U. S. incident to the arrival of our forces in Lebanon."<25>  
When Murphy arrived in Lebanon on 17 July, he discovered that many of the 
members of the Lebanese Parliament planned to protest to the U. S. against she 
American intervention.  He was able to persuade the legislators to drop this 
action, however, and concentrate on the problem of electing a new president.  
The Deputy Under Secretary met with Admiral Holloway on a daily basis.  The 
two agreed that much of the Lebanese internal conflict concerned personalities 
and  had very little relation to international issues.  It was apparent to 
both of them that Communism "was playing no direct or substantial part in the 
insurrection."<26>  The main outside support of the Lebanese rebels came from 
Egypt and Syria and direct intervention from the United Arab Republic as a 
result of the American landings was unlikely.  Murphy believed that the only 
solution to end the anarchy was the election of a new president.  He and 
Admiral Holloway felt that President Chamoun had overreached himself in the 
brambles of Lebanese politics and that the Lebanese Army was the only thing 
holding the government together.  General Chehab assured Murphy that the Army 
was willing to cooperate with the American forces but was unwilling to take 
any energetic action against the rebels, except to restrict rebel activity and 
contain it in certain districts.

     Murphy decided that the only way to create a viable government was to 
bring the leaders of the dissident elements of the country together.  Colonel 
William A. Eddy, a retired Marine officer, who was employed as a consultant to 
the American Arabian Oil Company, arranged for a meeting between Murphy and  
two of Saeb Salem's associates on 24 July.  The American attempted to convince 
the two Lebanese that the U. S. had not intervened in order to keep Chamoun in 
office.  He warned them that the indiscriminate firing at American troops 
should end.  Murphy reassured the rebel spokesmen that the Americans wished to 
avoid any serious clash, "however, we must maintain the security of our troops 
and we also value American prestige."<27>  Saeb Salem apparently took heed of 
the American warnings since the rebel provocations against the American troops 
dropped off after this date.

     Murphy was also able to convince the Druze chieftan Jumblatt and the 
Tripoli rebel leader Karami that the U. S. intervention was not for the 
purpose of maintaining any one man in office.  The way was then cleared for 
the Parliament to decide on a new president.  The election was held on 31 July 
and General Chehab was elected president although his term of office was not 
scheduled to begin until 23 September.  The


Lebanese Army Commander, by not taking sides in the insurrection and by 
maintaining the integrity of the national army, had the support of all the 
various Lebanese political factions.  With the hope of a stabilized government 
for Lebanon, the Americans were able to concentrate on the problems of pulling 
their troops out of Lebanon.

     Secretary of State Dulles announced on 31 July that the U. S. forces 
would be withdrawn as soon as the Lebanese Government requested their removal.  
On 5 August, Admiral Holloway was directed to begin planning for the departure 
of the American military forces.  The order was based on the assumption that 
General Chehab would request the Americans to to leave when he took office.  
The Americans wished to keep the selection of their departure date in their 
own hands.  Chehab indicated, however, that he wished the Americans to make 
only a token withdrawal until the internal situation in Lebanon was completely 

     General Wade on 6 August issued BLT 2/2 an order that placed the 
battalion on a 24-hour reembarkation alert.  By 11 August, Admiral Holloway 
had submitted a proposed withdrawal schedule to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  He 
decided to withdraw the Marine BLTs in advance of the Army troops because he 
was determined "knot to use Marines as `occupations' and static forces when 
and wherever it could be avoided."<28>  BLT 2/2 was to begin embarking 
immediately.  This battalion was to load on board the ships of TransPhibRon 6 
and to remain as a reserve force afloat.  The two battalions of the 8th 
Marines were slated to depart on 15 September for the United States, and the 
remaining Marine battalion, 3/6, was to leave on 30 September. The Army units 
were scheduled to withdraw in the latter part of October.

     On 14 August, as a gesture of American intentions, BLT2/2 completed its 
reembarkation.  The positions of the battalion were occupied by BLT 1/8.  The 
remaining Marine battalions continued to maintain security in the Beirut dock 
area and to guard the northeastern approaches to the city.  General Wade 
instituted a 30-hour weekly training program, which stressed individual and 
small-unit combat.  Emphasis was also placed on cooperation with the Lebanese 
Army.  Lebanese officers were often invited to visit the American positions 
and to observe American training techniques.  The most outstanding example of 
the latter was a joint Army-Marine exercise involving Company C of  BLT 1/8 
and an Army company from the 24th Airborne Brigade on 10 September.

     This training operation was held near J'Bail, 20 miles north of Beirut 
and near the Biblical town of Byblos.  While 13 Marine company rushed across 
the beach, 13 Marine and Army helicopters landed the Army company on two hills 
about 3,000 yards in from the beach.


     The preparation for this operation had been well publicized and 
approximately 3,000 Lebanese had gathered to witness the landings.  The Marine 
Ontos rolled off the two LCUs and Lebanese officers riding on top waved to the 
crowd.  The Marine company linked up with the Army troops and the entire 
exercise was secured by 1000.  The Marines and soldiers were then taken on a 
guided tour of the Byblos ruins.  This was to be the last American landing of 
the Lebanon operation.  On 15 September, the Marines of 1/8 and 2/8 sailed for 
the United States.  The Army brigade took over the responsibility of the 
Beirut dock area and BLT 3/6 remained in the positions guarding the 
north-eastern approaches.

     Chehab succeeded Chamoun as President of Lebanon on 23 September.  The 
Lebanese general chose as prime minister, Rashid Karami, who had formed a 
cabinet composed mainly of former rebel leaders.  This action triggered 
further political dissension, which resulted in the supporters of former 
President Chamoun calling for a general strike and the dissolution of the new 
government.  The American forces did not intervene but established Army-Marine 
tank-infantry task forces to meet any emergency.  The Lebanese Army on the 
24th broke up a major clash between irregular forces favoring Chamoun and 
those of the former rebels.  Both sides, impressed by the determination of the 
Lebanese Army to end the fighting, commenced negotiations to end the political 

     On 29 September, RLT 6, commanded by Colonel William B. McKennan and 
composed of BLT 2/6 and a regimental headquarters staff, arrived in Beirut 
harbor on board the ships of TransPhibRon 8, commanded by Captain Charles L. 
Werts.  The CAMBRIA, the command ship of the Amphibious Squadron tied up at 
the docks alongside of Admiral Holloway's flagship, the TACONIC.  On the same 
day, 3/6 departed, leaving the RLT as a ready reserve to the Army troops in 
Lebanon.  General Wade and Admiral Yeager left Beirut for the United States on 
3 October, and Colonel McKennan and Captain Werts assumed command of the 
Marines in Lebanon and the Amphibious Task Force respectively.

     The United States announced on 8 October that it was withdrawing all its 
forces from Lebanon.  Through the period of 18 October, however, the date of 
departure of the RLT, nearly 2,000 Marines remained in the Beirut dock area 
and Captain Werts and Colonel McKennan "conducted considerable reconnaissance 
work throughout the Lebanese coastal area at Admiral Holloway's personal 
direction."<29>  On 23 October, the Lebanese formed a government which 
included representatives from each of the major political parties and the last 
U. S. Army troops departed the country two days later.

     From the vantage of today there seems to have been little connection 
between the Iraqi Revolution and the unrest in Lebanon, but it must be 
emphasized that this was not known at


the time.  There was a precarious political situation in Lebanon and also a 
real fear on the part of the loyalist supporters of Chamoun for the safety of 
his life and for the independence of the country.<30>  Even if the events of 
14 July were not the result of an international conspiracy, the balance of 
power in the Middle East could have been destroyed, creating a situation 
susceptible to Soviet exploitation.

     The American intervention did succeed in proving the ability of the 
American military forces to react boldly and effectively, although the Marine 
battalion landed and remained without full logistical and combat support for a 
period of some 16 hours.  Political necessity had forced President Eisenhower 
to disregard Admiral Burke's request for 24 hours notice and the BLUEBAT 
concept of a two-battalion landing had to be modified.

     Though political factors determined the military commitment, there was an 
incomplete liaison between the American diplomat on the scene and the military 
commanders.  The American Ambassador in this age of immediate communication, 
was dependent upon information about the movement of the Amphibious Squadron 
from modern day "cliff dwellers" in Beirut.  This lack of communication was 
largely responsible for the bizarre disagreements between the military and the 
Embassy on 15 July.  As one observer has stated:

        ...ideally there should be close contact between the
     Ambassador and the Commander in a developing crisis.  Reports 
     should be maintained between the mission and the command.  But
     once under way, a military intervention cannot be radically 
     shifted at the last minute without affecting its efficiency and
     possible success in gaining positions necessary for the presence
     of American forces.<31>

     Despite the misunderstandings on the first day, the Marines were able to 
complete their initial missions within a few hours of landing.  Through the 
cooperation of Ambassador McClintock and General Chehab on the next day, BLT 
2/2 consolidated American strength in the city of Beirut.  As events turned 
out, 16 July was the climax of the entire operation.  The remaining period was 
confined to a holding action until the Lebanese could settle their differences 
among themselves.  The American forces provided a stabilizing influence on the 
Lebanese political scene.  The Marine landings in Lebanon vividly demonstrated 
the close interplay between American military preparedness and the success of 
U. S. diplomacy.



                                   Section I

 (1)  Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from 
Human Relations Area Files, Inc., Special Warfare Area Handbook for Lebanon 
dtd 15Jan58 (Lebanon File); Cdr James T. Alexander, Jr., "The U. S. 
Intervention in Lebanon 1958," Student Thesis, dtd 25Jan61, U. S. Army War 
College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (Lebanon File), hereafter Alexander, 
"The U. S. Intervention in Lebanon"; Robert McClintock, "The American Landing 
in Lebanon,"  "United States Naval Institute Proceedings," v. LXXXVIII, no. 10 
(Oct62), pp. 65-79, hereafter McClintock, "The American Landing."  Unless 
otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the Historical 
Reference Section, Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC.

 (2)  Ambassador Robert McClintock, Comments on draft manuscript, "circa" 
11Oct65 (Lebanon Comment File, hereafter "McClintock Comments."

 (3)  "Lebanon Handbook," op. cit., p. 348.

 (4)  Leila M. T. Meo, "Lebanon, Improbable Nation, A Study In Political 
Development" (Bloomington, Indiana:  University of Indiana Press, 1965), pp. 
150-151, hereafter Meo, "Lebanon."

 (5)  McClintock, "The American Landing," p. 66.

 (6)  Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Waging Peace" (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., 1965) p. hereafter Eisenhower, "Waging Peace."

 (7)  Eleanor Lansing Dulles, "John Foster Dulles:  The Last Year" (New York:  
Harcourt, Brace, and World Inc. 1963), pp. 142-143.

 (8)  "Time, The Weekly News Magazine," v. LXXII, no. 4 (28Jul58) p. 6.

 (9)  Eisenhower, "Waging Peace," p. 273.

(10)  "Time," op. cit.


                                   Section II

 (1)  Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from 
Transcript of BGen Sidney S. Wade Presentation to the Commandant Marine Corps, 
on 4Nov58, Subj:  Recent Operations in Lebanon (Lebanon File), hereafter "Wade 
Presentation"; G-3 Div, HQMC, Lebanese Journal, dtd 14Jul-30Sep Lebanon File), 
hereafter "G-3 Journal"; Hq, 2d Provisional Marine Force, Lebanon Final 
Report, Task Force 62 and Marine Corps Troops assigned SPECOMME 18May-3Oct58 
(Lebanon File), hereafter "Lebanon Final Report;" CinCSPECOMME, Command Report 
Operation BLUEBAT 15Jul-25Oct58, dtd 5Dec58 (Lebanon File), hereafter 
CinCSPECOMME, "Command Report"; Hq, American Land Forces, Lebanon, 
After-Action Report 15Jul-25Oct58, dtd 25Oct58 (Lebanon File), hereafter 
AmLanFor, "After-Action Report"; BLT 2/2, Command Diaries for Jul-Aug58 
(Lebanon File), hereafter "2/2 CmdDs"; Col Harry A. Hadd, "Orders Firm But 
Flexible"; "United States Naval Institute Proceedings," v. LXXXVIII, no. 10 
(Oct62), pp. 81-89; hereafter Hadd, "Orders Firm But Flexible"; BGen Sidney S. 
Wade, "Operation Bluebat"; "Marine Corps Gazette," v. XLIII, no. 7 (Jul59), 
pp. 10-23, hereafter Wade, "Operation   Bluebat"; Alexander, "The U. S. 
Intervention in Lebanon."

 (2)  Press Release, Units of the Sixth Fleet, dtd 14Jul58 (Clipping File, 

 (3)  General Wade had been briefed on 31 March and 14 April for possible 
deployment of his headquarters in connection with the Lebanese unrest, but the 
main mission of the 2d Provisional Marine Force had remained the planning of 
COMBINE II.  There was no special significance to the name given to the 
headquarters.  It was the "2d" as it was from the 2d Division and it was 
"provisional" and it was a "Marine forced."  See Maj Duncan D. Chaplin, 
"Planning Breeds Success," MS. n.d. (Lebanon File), p. 15, hereafter Chaplin, 
"Planning"; and LtGen Henry W. Buse, Jr., interview by HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 
25Mar65 (Lebanon File).

 (4)  Chief of Naval Operations msg to Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet and 
CinCNELM, dtd 15May58 (G-3 Division, HQMC, Messages and Orders re:  Lebanon 

 (5)   Capt Howard J. Baker, USN, Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 13Dec65 
(Lebanon Comment File, hereafter "Baker Comments."

 (6)   Chaplin, "Planning," pp. 11-18.

 (7)   MajGen David W. Gray, USA, Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 10Dec65 
(Lebanon Comment File), hereafter "Gray Comments."

 (8)   G-3 Division, HQMC, Staff Brief of Amphibious Operation BLUEBAT, dtd 
9Jun58 (Lebanon File).


(9)   CNO msg to CinCNELM and Commander Sixth Fleet, dtd 14Jul58 in "G-3 

(10)  Adm Arleigh Burke, Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 29Nov65 (Lebanon 
Comment File).

(11)  "Time, The Weekly News Magazine," v. LXXII, no. 4 (28Jul58), p. 11.

                                  Section III

 (1)  Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from 
"Wade Presentation; G-3 Journal"; CinSPECOMME, "Command Report; Lebanon Final 
Report; 2/2 CmdDs"; Hadd, "Orders Firm But Flexible;" McClintock,"The American 

 (2)  Philip N. Pierce, "Show of Force:  Lebanon," "Leatherneck," v.XLV, no. 9 
(Sep62), p. 36.

 (3)  Col Harry A. Hadd interview by Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC, dtd 20Dec65 
(Lebanon File), hereafter "Hadd Interview."

 (4)  "Washington Post and Times Herald," 16Jul58, p. 12.

 (5)  Charles W. Thayer, "Diplomat" (New York:  Harper & Bros., 1959) p. 29, 
hereafter Thayer, "Diplomat."

 (6)  CNO msg to CinCNELM and Commander Sixth Fleet, dtd 15Jul58 in "G-3 

 (7)  Ambassador McClintock msg to Dept of State, dtd 14Jul58 (Lebanon File).

 (8)  U. S. Army Attache, Beirut msg to Department of the Army, Headquarters 
US Air Force, and to CNO, dtd 15Jul58 in Dispatches Relative to U. S. 
Landings, Lebanon (Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Division).

 (9)  Ambassador McClintock msg to Dept of State, dtd 15Jul58 (Lebanon File).

(10)  Ambassador McClintock msg to Dept of State, dtd 14Jul58 (Lebanon File).

(11)  Thayer, "Diplomat," p. 29.

(12)  "Baker Comments."

(13)  "New York Times," 27Jul58, Pt. 4, p. 1.


(14)  There is some dispute as to the time of the arrival of the support 
aircraft from the ESSEX.  The commander of the ESSEX stated that the aircraft 
arrived on station at 1450 Beirut time), 10 minutes before the landing.  
Admiral Holloway on the other hand claims that the planes did not arrive until 
15 minutes after the landing.  See the Cruise Report of the ESSEX for Feb to 
Nov58, dtd 11Feb59 (Operational Archives, Naval Historical Division); 
CinSPECOMME, "Command Report," Enclosure 6, Operations, p. 8.

(15)  "2/2 CmdDs Jul58," p. 2; "McClintock Comments."

(16)  "Baker Comments."

(17)  Quoted in Ambassador McClintock msg to Dept of State, dtd 15Jul58 
(Lebanon File).

(18)  Commander Task Unit 61.1.3 msg to Commander Sixth Fleet, dtd 15Jul58 in 
Dispatches Relative to U. S. Landings, Lebanon (Operational Archives Branch, 
Naval Historical Division).

(19)  Commander Sixth Fleet msg to Commander Task Unit 61.1.3 dtd 15Jul58 in 
Sixth Fleet Dispatches Relative to U. S. Landings, Lebanon (Operational 
Archives Branch, Naval Historical Division).

(20)  Hadd, "Orders Firm but Flexible," p. 84.

(21)  "Hadd Interview."

(22)  "Ibid."; RAdm Victor B. McCrea, Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 
10Dec65 (Lebanon Comment File), hereafter "McCrea Comments."

                                  Section IV

 (1)  Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from 
"Wade Presentation"; Col Robert M. Jenkins interview by Historical Branch, 
G-3, HQMC, dtd 9Oct64 (Lebanon File); "G-3 Journal"; CinCSPECOMME, "Command 
Report"; "Lebanon Final Report"; "2/2 CmdDs"; 3/6 CmdDs for Jul-5Oct58 
(Lebanon File), hereafter "3/6 CmdDs"; Hadd, "Orders Firm But Flexible"; 
McClintock, "The American Landing"; Wade, "Operation Bluebat."

(2)  "McCrea Comments."

(3)  The Ontos is a lightly-armored, tracked antitank vehicle carrying six 
106mm recoilless rifles.  The mechanical mule is a four-wheel drive, flat-bed, 
open-body vehicle with a 1/2 ton load capacity.

(4)  "2/2 CmdDs."


(5)  MajGen Sidney S. Wade, Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 26Nov65 (Lebanon 
Comment File).

(6) Adm James L. Holloway, Jr., Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 2Dec65 
(Lebanon Comment File), hereafter "Holloway Comments."

(7)  Ibid.

                                   Section V

(1)  Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from "Wade 
Presentation"; "G-3 Journal"; G-3 Div, Lebanon Crisis File, dtd 14Jul-13Aug58 
(Lebanon File); Lebanon Final Report; CinCSPECOMME, "Command Report"; 
AmLanFor, "After-Action Report"; HQMC, Commandant Marine Corps Briefing 
Notes-Lebanon, dtd Jul-Sep58 (Lebanon File), hereafter "CMC Briefing Notes"; 
Col Charles W. Harrison, Notes from Middle East Briefings at HQMC, dtd 
18Jul-10Nov58 (Lebanon File); Robert D. Little and Wilhelmine Burch, "Air 
Operations in the Lebanon Crisis of 1958," dtd Oct62 (U. S. Air Force 
Historical Division Liaison Office, Silver Spring, Maryland); G-3 Div, Hq, U. 
S. Army, Europe, "The U. S. Army Task Force in Lebanon," dtd 1959 (Lebanon 
File); 2d Provisional Marine Force, CmdDs for Jul-Oct58 (Lebanon File); "2/2 
CmdDs"; "3/6 CmdDs"; BLT 1/8, CmdDs for Jul-15Sep58 (Lebanon File; Plans and 
Readiness Branch, Aviation Division, HQMC memo for file, dtd 8Jan59, Subj:  
Recap on Airlift (Lebanon File); Wade, "Operation Bluebat." 

(2)  Col Hamilton Lawrence, Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 28Nov65 (Lebanon 
Comment File).

(3)  Provisional Table of Organization 1038, dtd 14Feb58 provided for a four 
rifle company Marine battalion.  As BLT 17 was in the Mediterranean area at 
this time, its organization has not affected.

(4)  "Washington Evening Star," 18Jul58, p. 1.

(5)  Eisenhower, "Waging Peace," p. 273.

(6)  "Gray Comments."

(7)  The B-57 is a twin-jet Canberra medium bomber, and the F-100 is a North 
American Super-saber single-engine fighter-bomber.

(8)  General Roberts was replaced by Major General Henry Vicellio on 21 July.

(9)  The R4Q-2 is the Fairchild Flying Boxcar twin-engine transport and the 
R5D is the Douglas Skymaster, four-engine transport.  In Nov62 DOD directed a 
new all-service designation


system for aircraft.  The R4Q-2 is now the C-119F and the R5D is now the C-54.

(10)  The C-124 is the Douglas Globemaster four-engine transport, larger and 
with a greater load-carrying capacity than the R5D or R4Q.

(11)  CinCSPECOMME msg to CNO, dtd 19Jul58 in G-3 Journal.

(12)  "Wade Presentation."

(13)  Ibid.

(14)  HMR is the Marine Corps designation for a medium helicopter transport 
squadron.  The HRS-3 is the Sikorsky single-rotor transport helicopter with a 
load capacity of eight troops.  The HRS-3 is now designated the CH19E.

(15)  Department of Defense Press release, dtd 19Aug58, entitled "Choppers 
Steal the Show" (Clipping File, Lebanon).

(16)  LtCol Thomas B. Sparkman, Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 13Dec65 
(Lebanon Comment File).

(17)  Ibid.

(18)  "Lebanon Final Report," p. 41.

(19)  Commander Amphibious Group 4 Report on Amphibious Operations in Lebanon, 
dtd 15Sep58 (Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Division).  In his 
comments dtd 23Nov65 on the draft manuscript, Admiral Yeager made the 
statement:  "I had asked for Medical Officers trained in surgery or anesthesia
prior to our landing, but had not received any."  (Lebanon Comment File).

(20)  "Holloway Comments."

(21)  "Lebanon Final Report," p. 17.

(22)  Wade, "Operation Bluebat," p. 20.

(23)  "2/2 CmdDs" Jul58, Command Evaluation, p. 2.

(24)  Hq, AmLanFor, "After-Action Report," Part III, p. 3.

(25)  Robert D. Murphy, "Diplomat Among Warriors" (Garden City, New York:  
Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1964) p. 398.

(26)  Ibid., p. 404.

(27)  "CMC Briefing Notes," Sep58.


(28)  "Holloway Comments."

(29)  Col William J. McKennan, Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 18Jan66 
(Lebanon Comment File).

(30)  Meo, "Lebanon," p. 197.

(31)  Harold G. Josif, "Civil-Military Coordination in a Country That Requests 
Limited Military Intervention," "Air War College Supplement," v. II, no. 1 
(Sep63), p. 21.





                               AS OF 19 JULY 1958

Commanding General. . . . . . . . . . . . . . BGen Sidney S. Wade

Chief of Staff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Col Hamilton Lawrence

G-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maj Thomas B. Sparkman

G-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LtCol Nathan R. Smith

G-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LtCol James B. Glennon, Jr.

G-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LtCol Martin C. Roth

                           Battalion Landing Team 2/2

Commanding Officer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . LtCol Harry A. Hadd

Executive Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maj Paul R. Nugent

S-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maj Samuel A. Cox

Commanding Officer,
Headquarters and Service
Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maj Wendall M. Waskom

Commanding Officer,
Company E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt Gerald H. Hyndman

Commanding Officer,
Company F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt George E. Shepherd

Commanding Officer,
Company G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt Terence M. Allen

Commanding Officer,
Company H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt Thomas E. Bulger

Commanding Officer,
Battery B, 1/10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt Robert D. Boles

                           Battalion Landing Team 3/6

Commanding Officer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . LtCol Robert M. Jenkins

Executive Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maj Hoyt C. Duncan

S-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maj Edwin W. Killian


Commanding Officer,
Headquarters and
Service Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt Hershel B. Jones

Commanding Officer,
Company I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt Floyd A. Karker

Commanding Officer,
Company J . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt Robert A. Cronk

Commanding Officer,
Company L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt Richard W. Coulter

Commanding Officer,
Company M . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt Leonard E. Wood

Commanding Officer,
Battery H, 3/10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt William H. Thurber

                           Battalion Landing Team 1/8

Commanding Officer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . LtCol John II. Brickley

Executive Office. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maj Richard L. Michael, Jr.

S-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maj Victor Stoyanow

Commanding Officer,
Headquarters and
Service Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1stLt Clyde E. Taylor

Commanding Officer,
Weapons Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maj Donald A. Chiapetti

Commanding Officer,
Company A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1stLt Richard B. McLaughlin

Commanding Officer,
Company B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt Andrew E. Andersen

Commanding Officer,
Company C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt Clyde A. Trowbridge

Commanding Officer,
Battery I, 3/10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt Ronald P. Dunwell


                     2d Battalion, 8th Marines (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . LtCol Alfred A. Tillman

S-3 and Acting
Executive Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maj David D. Powell

Commanding Officer,
Headquarters and
Service Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1stLt Raymond A. Yakaitis

Commanding Officer,
Company F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt Robert L. Zuern

Commanding Officer,
Company G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt Wells L. Field III

Commanding Officer,
Company H . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capt Owen J. Butler

Commanding Officer,
Company K, 3/8, attached. . . . . . . . . . . Capt William P. Howley

                            Logistics Support Group

Commanding Officer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maj Lawrence J. Bradley
                                              (Relieved on 31 Aug 1958 by
                                              LtCol Carl E. Fulton)

                            Sub Unit 1, HMR (L) 262

Commanding Officer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Major Samuel "C" Roach, Jr.


                       LIST OF MARINE UNITS ELIGIBLE FOR
                        LEBANON  1 July--1 November 1958

2d Provisional Marine Force (Headquarters)
             16 Jul - 30 Sep

Battalion Landing Team, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines
             15 Jul - 13 Aug

     2d Battalion, 2d Marines
     Battery B, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines
     3d Platoon (Reinf), Company B, 2d
        Pioneer battalion
     Platoon (-) (Reinf), 1st Shore Party Team,
        Company A, 2d Shore Party Battalion
     1st Platoon (Reinf), Company B, 2d Motor
        Transport Battalion
     Detachment, Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marines
     Detachment, Anti-Tank Company, 2d Marines
     Detachment, Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division
     Detachment, 2d Medical Battalion
     Detachment, 2d Service Regiment
     Detachment, Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
     Detachment, 2d Force Service Regiment
     Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Demolition Platoon,
        8th Engineer Battalion
     Detachment, Ordnance Maintenance Company
     Detachment, 8th Communication Battalion
     Detachment, 2d ANGLICO
     Platoon, 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion
     Detachment, Marine Aircraft Group 26

Battalion Landing Team, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines
             16 Jul - 1 Oct

     3d Battalion, 6th Marines
     Battery H (Reinf), 3d Battalion, 10th Marines
     3d Platoon, Company B, 2d Pioneer Battalion
     Truck Platoon, Company B, 2d Motor Transport Battalion
     1st Platoon (Reinf), Company B,
        2d Anti-Tank Battalion
     1st Platoon, 2d 8" Howitzer Battery,
        (Self-Propelled) (Provisional)


     3d Platoon (Reinf) Company A, 2d Force
        Tank Battalion
     Detachment, Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division
     Detachment, 2d Service Regiment
     Detachment, Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
     Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Demolition Platoon,
        8th Engineer Battalion
     Detachment, 8th Communication Battalion
     Detachment, 2d ANGLICO
     Detachment, 2d Force Service Regiment
     Detachment, Headquarters Battalion, Marine Corps Base,
        Camp Lejeune, North Carolina (Stewards)

Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines
             18 Jul - 18 Sep

     1st Battalion, 8th Marines
     Battery I (Reinf), 3d Battalion, 10th Marines
     1st Platoon (Reinf), Company A, 2d Pioneer Battalion
     Platoon (Reinf), Company C, 2d Tank Battalion
     Platoon (-) (Reinf), 1st Shore Party Team,
        Company B, 2d Shore Party Battalion
     Platoon (-) (Reinf), Company A, 2d Motor
        Transport Battalion
     Detachment, Headquarters Battalion, 8th Marines
     Detachment, 2d Service Regiment
     Detachment, Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
     Detachment, 2d Force Service Regiment
     Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Demolition Platoon,
        8th Engineer Battalion
     Detachment, 8th Communication Battalion
     Detachment, 2d ANGLICO
     Platoon, 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion
     1st Platoon, Company B, 2d 8" Howitzer Battery

2d Battalion, 8th Marines (-106mm Recoilless Rifle Platoon) (Reinf)
             18 Jul - 18 Sep

     1st Platoon, Company A, 2d Tank Battalion
     2d Platoon, Company B, 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion
     Detachment, 2d ANGLICO
     Detachment, Assault Gun Platoon Headquarters Company,
        187th Airborne Battle Group, USA


Regimental Landing Team, 6th Marines (-)
             1 - 10 Oct

     2d Battalion  6th Marines
     Battery G (-) (Reinf), 3d Battalion, 10th Marines
     Detachment, Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division
     Detachment, 2d Service Battalion
     Detachment, 2d Dental Company
     Detachment, Headquarters Battalion, Marine Corps Base,
        Camp Lejeune, North Carolina (Stewards)
     Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Demolition Platoon,
        8th Engineer Battalion
     Detachment, 2d Anti-Tank Battalion
     Detachment, 2d ANGLICO (Provisional) (Reinf)
     Detachment, 8th Communication Battalion
     Detachment, 2d Force Service Regiment
     Detachment, 2d Force Tank Battalion
     Detachment, Regimental Headquarters
     2d Truck Platoon, Company C, 2d Motor Transport Battalion
     3d Platoon, Company A, 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion
     4th Platoon, 2d 8" Howitzer Battery
        (Self Propelled) (Provisional)

Marine Transport Squadron 153
             18 Jul - 28 Jul

Marine Transport Squadron 252
             18 - 21 Jul

Marine Transport Squadron 352
             18 - 20 Jul

Marine Transport Squadron 353
             18 - 27 Jul

Sub Unit #1  Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron
     (Light) 262
             19 Jul - 16 Sep

Regional Headquarters Region 2, Marine Security Guards,
   American Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon
             14 Jul - 18 Oct

Marine Security Guard, American Embassy,
   Beirut, Lebanon
             14 Jul - 18 Oct