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Appendiks 18

Ad verbum:

Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Minister of Foreign Affairs


December 12, 1993

Dear Chris,

  1. Many thanks for your letter written upon your departure from the Middle East yesterday.
  2. I agree with your points concerning rapid and effective implementation of the DOP.
  3. Mr. Arafat remains, as I see it, concerned about security and his ability to provide it following Israeli withdrawal. He has somewhat inflated view of his security requirements and the paraphernalia needed to meet them. However, he is probably also concerned about others (Iran? Syria?) “buying” his “fighters” from Algeria and/or Yemen.
  4. Hence, I believe we should be forthcoming in form if not som much in substance. He should be granted the right as enshrined in the DOP to form strong police forces. In conversations with me he has often referred to the Egyptian model (not our ideal, perhaps, but it may seem appropriate in a Middle East context).
  5. I share your concern about the Arafat-Rabin meeting in Cairo. Arafat clearly feels that he is in a corner at it is certainly useful for Mubarak and/or Moussa [foreign minister Amr Moussa] to talk to him prior to the meeting, as I now know they will. I am willing to send a small team of Norwegian experts on peacekeeping in the Middle East to discuss practicalities of security arrangements with Arafat and his people if you think it is a good idea. The purpose would be to sharpen his view on requirements and to bring some operational realism into PLO-planning for the post-withdrawal environment. He seems to trust us and we could probably do something which others whose motives he might be more suspicious of would find it hard to achieve. I have in mind a two-phased approach where the first phase would be one of discussion and defining security requirement to be dealt with by a strong Palestinian police force envisaged in the DOP. The next phase might involve a visit to Jericho and Gaza as well as in depth discussions with the Israelis and the PLO. The team would report to me in my capacity as chairman of the AHLC. It could help, hopefully in defining requirements for internal security (Article VIII of the DOP) and for an international pressure (Annex II in the DOP, Article 3 point D.). We would need to have Israeli concurrence in moving to such a second phase.
  6. I concur with your view that the important point this close to the Cairo meeting is to maintain the credibility of the process and to maintain a degree of momentum even if it falls somewhat short of what is projected in the DOP. It is my sense that Arafat is extremely sensitive about the security issue and feels he is not given a fair judgment by Israel or the US. He put on a quite show the night I talked to him about it here in Oslo. He must not been left with the sense of being betrayed or left behind. He seems to trust the Norwegians and we should consider seriously how to transform that trust into progress concerning implementation.
  7. For Arafat I think not-lethal equipment is not sufficient. He feels betrayed and not trusted if all parties insists that he has to give up the armed struggle, be denied any armed capacity and become a victim of the armed opposition to the DOP. He sees, of course, also that Fatah arms may play a role in the struggle for power among the Palestinians. We really cannot have it both ways, nor can the Israelis. If the PLO is to be a partner it has to be accorded a minimum of trust. We should insist on the importance to constitute an ecumenical police force with the respect to the competing factions of the FATAH and outside, but the agreement is with the PLO. I know you have som legal restraints in this field. However, we need to get a feel for your basic thinking on order to assess the appropriate course of action.
  8. We are willing to play a role here but we need to know where you stand. It is my sense that time is running out.
  9. I did not, in spite of many attempts, manage to get hold of Chairman Arafat last night. However, Abu Alaa returned my call this morning. He seemed pleased about my concern and initiative. I also conveyed your concern, understanding and constraints. I expressed my willingness to host an ad hoc meeting of the AHCL coming Friday/Saturday here in Oslo to which we could invite the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, Greece, Russia, Japan, South Korea, the EC, USA, Sweden and Norway. They will call me back at 1500 hrs. Norwegian local time today. I also offered to send a small team of four Norwegian experts with experience in peacekeeping in the Middle East to discuss modalities and requirements in Tunis prior to a meeting which we would propose to host here in Oslo. The purpose would be to inject as much professional realism as possible to PLO deliberations of there issues.
  10. With respect to the multinational meeting in Tokyo, I want to send a team to brief the Steering Group but would not presume to participate on other items than those we would be invited to report. However, our presence in Tokyo makes it possible for us to respond effectively to any Steering Group decision to ask Norway to join as a member.

    (Signed Johan Jørgen Holst)

Last modified: Sun Aug 30 20:49:28 2015 - BL